VI

B

And this thinker [Melissus] argues: If, then, it were a physical body, the "One" would be many. But if Being exists, concerning the "One" in the universe it must itself be one; it ought to have a body, yet it does not. For if it possessed depth original: "pachos" – thickness or volume, it would have parts, and it would no longer be one. This, then, is the part and the whole, but perhaps not in relation to the totality, because it has not come to be everywhere. the Concerning the greater length and the whole; and how could there be more? And if more, in what way more? And concerning the parts of the bodies, even if it were one with the whole, how would it be divisible? Because these things are themselves to it. But indeed, as something divisible, it was shown how it would act in this way. Melissus says that Being is infinite; yet it is not "containing" as if by a limiter. For the limit divides that which is limited. But indeed, if in the same place where Being is, all things were as one body. This whole was sufficient, agreeing with them; for he will show the same thing through it, both the "One," and if something exists also in the "Good," as if the same thing were indivisible and not good. And a horse and a horse; and not concerning the existence of things that are, it will be for them as wholes. But concerning nothingness, and that the equal is the equal, if it is the same.

Later thinkers and the Peripatetics The followers of Aristotle, known for walking while teaching were also troubled, lest it should happen to them that the same thing is both one and many at the same time. Therefore, some removed the word "is," as Lycophron A 4th-century BCE sophist did; others restructured the phrasing, saying not "the man is white," but that he "has been whitened," or not "he is walking," but "he walks." They did this so that by not attaching the word "is," they would not make the "One" into "Many"—as if I were agreeing with the name. But things that exist are many, either by definition—as when one thing is "being" and another is "musical," yet both are the same person—or many by division, as the whole and the parts. Here they were already at a loss, while also admitting that the "One" is "Many"; as if it were not possible for the same thing to be both one and many, unless they are opposites. For the "One" exists both potentially and actually. In this manner, I have told you, it appears impossible for the "One" to be "Being"; and in the way they demonstrate this, it is difficult to solve the problem; for both sides are at play.