Twenty-four Dialogues of Plato

k...? original: "κ..." - likely a scribal shorthand for "kephalaion" (chapter/point) or a reference mark.

...Euthyphro; and are they The gods. harsh to one another; and is there a ground for this very conflict against one another? And has this very thing been said? Or rather, we must ask: from where does the hatred and anger arise when we have a difference of opinion? Let us look at it this way: if you and I were to differ about which of two numbers was greater, would a dispute about such a thing make us enemies and angry at one another? Or, by resorting to calculation, would we be quickly rid of such matters?

Euthyphro: Certainly.

Socrates: And if we differed about the greater and the smaller, by resorting to measurement, would we not quickly stop the disagreement?

Euthyphro: That is so.

Socrates: And by resorting to weighing, I suppose, we would reach a decision about the heavier and the lighter?

Euthyphro: Certainly.

Socrates: Then over what subject would a disagreement arise that we could not bring to a decision, making us enemies to one another and angry? Perhaps it is not ready to hand for you; but while I am speaking, consider if it is these things: the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, and the good and the bad. Socrates identifies values and ethics as the "undecidable" subjects that lead to human (and divine) strife, unlike math or science. Are these not the things about which, when we disagree and cannot reach an adequate decision, we become enemies to each other—whenever we do become so—both I and you and all other men?

Euthyphro: This is exactly the nature of the disagreement, Socrates, and it is about these things.

Socrates: What about the gods, Euthyphro? If they disagree at all, wouldn't they disagree about these very same things?

Euthyphro: It is absolutely necessary.

Socrates: Then according to your argument, noble Euthyphro, different gods consider different things to be just, and beautiful and ugly, and good and bad. For they would not, I suppose, be in conflict with one another unless they disagreed about these things. Is that right?

Euthyphro: You are right.

Socrates: Then the things that each of them considers to be beautiful, good, and just, these they also love, and the opposites of these they hate?

Euthyphro: Certainly.

Socrates: But the very same things, as you say, some gods consider just dikaion: that which is right or lawful and others consider unjust adikon: that which is wrong or unlawful, and it is over these things that they dispute and go to war with one another. Is that not so?

Euthyphro: It is so.

Socrates: Then the same things, it seems, are both hated by the gods and loved by the gods; and the same things would be both god-hated theomises: literally "hated by the gods" and god-loved theophiles: literally "loved by the gods"?

Euthyphro: It seems so.

Socrates: And so, Euthyphro, by this logic, the same things would be both holy hosion: pious or sanctioned by divine law and unholy anosion: impious or forbidden by the gods?

Euthyphro: It appears likely.

Socrates: Then you did not answer what I asked, you marvelous man. For I did not ask for that which happens to be both holy and unholy; yet it seems that whatever is loved by the gods is also hated by them. So, it is not at all surprising if what you are doing now—punishing your father—is something that is pleasing to Zeus, but...