Twenty-four Dialogues of Plato

A large repair patch on the left side of the manuscript obscures the beginning of most lines. The following translation reconstructs these missing portions based on the standard text of Plato’s Euthyphro, while marking the obscured sections.

...with us;? but in his case original: "ἐκείνου" referring to Daedalus, it seemed to me that nothing was so stable.? But since you seem to me to be acting soft, I will help you be eager;? tell me, what is the pious? Do you understand that it seems to you that all that is just? is pious? I do. But is all that is pious just? Is not all that is just pious,? but rather one part of it is pious, and the other part is not? Shall we say it is so, or does it not seem? so to you? I agree; for it seems to me to be said rightly. See then what follows next: if? the pious is a part of the just, we must, as it seems, discover? what sort of part of the just the pious would be. If, then, you asked me? what part of arithmetic is the "even"—I would have said that it is that which? is not scalene, but isosceles. In ancient Greek mathematics, "isosceles" (equal-sided) was a technical term for even numbers because they could be divided into two equal parts, while odd numbers were "scalene" (uneven). Does it not seem so to you? I agree. Try then? you also to teach me in this way, what part of the just the pious is,? so that we may? tell Meletus Socrates' accuser in his upcoming trial to no longer do us wrong nor indict us for impiety,? since we have already sufficiently learned from you what is godly and? pious and what is not.

Well then, Socrates, it seems to me that this part of the? just is both godly and pious: the part concerning the service of the gods.? But the part concerning the service of men is the remaining part of justice.?

And you seem to me, Euthyphro, to speak? excellently. But I still need one small thing: for I do not yet understand? this "service" therapeia: service, care, or tending to you name. For surely you do not mean it is? the same sort as the service regarding other things, such as that regarding the gods? For we say, for example, that not everyone knows how to perform? service for horses, but only the horse-trainer. Isn't that right? Certainly.? For surely horse-training? is the service of horses. Yes. Nor does everyone know how to perform? service for dogs, but only the huntsman. Is it so? It is. For huntsmanship? is the service of dogs. Yes. And ox-tending is for oxen. Yes. But then? holiness and piety are the service of the gods, Euthyphro? Is that what you say?? I do.

Now, does not every service accomplish the same thing? That is, something like? this: it is for some good and benefit of the one being served. Just as you see,? surely, that horses served by horse-training are benefited? and become better. Or does it not seem so to you? It does. And dogs, surely,? by huntsmanship, and oxen by ox-tending, and? all other things likewise. Or do you think service? is for the harm of the one being served? By Zeus, I do not. But for their benefit? How could it not be?? Then is piety, being a service of the gods, a benefit to the gods? and does it make the gods better? And would you concede this: that whenever? you do something pious, you make one of the gods better? By Zeus, I? certainly do not!

Neither do I think, Euthyphro, that you mean this. I am far? from thinking it. But it was for this reason I asked what you meant by the service? of the gods, not believing you meant such a thing. And rightly so,? Socrates; for I do not mean such a thing.

Very well. But then what sort of service of the gods? would piety be? The kind, Socrates, that slaves? give to their masters.? I understand. It would be a kind of ministering, as? it seems, to the gods? original: "hyperetike" – a subordinate service or "under-rowing," like a crewman to a captain. How could it not be? Could you then say, the ministering? to physicians is a ministering toward the production of what work? Do you not think it is? toward health? I do.