Twenty-four Dialogues of Plato

...carried out at the same time: and the thing being led, it is led because of the leading Socrates is establishing a rule of grammar and logic: an action (like leading) causes a state (being led), not the other way around.; therefore everything is so. Not, then, because it is a seen thing is it seen; but on the contrary, because it is seen, it is a seen thing. Nor because it is an audible thing is it heard; but because it is heard, it is an audible thing. Nor because it is a carried thing is it carried; but because it is carried, it is a carried thing. Is it quite clear, Euthyphro, what I mean? I mean this: if anything becomes something or is acted upon, it does not become because it is a "becoming thing," but it is a "becoming thing" because it becomes; nor is it acted upon because it is a "thing acted upon," but it is a "thing acted upon" because it is acted upon. Or do you not agree it is so? I do. Then the "loved thing" is either something becoming or something being acted upon by another? Certainly. And this, then, is the same as the previous cases: it is not loved by those who love it because it is a "loved thing," but it is a "loved thing" because it is loved? Necessarily.

What then do we say about the pious, Euthyphro? Is it anything other than being loved by all the gods, according to your argument? It is that. Is it loved because it is pious, or for some other reason? No, for that reason. Then it is loved because it is pious; but it is not pious because it is loved? It seems so. But surely that which is dear to the godstheophiles

6 is, by the very fact of being dear to the gods, a thing loved by the gods? How could it be otherwise? Then the "dear to the gods" is not the same as the "pious," Euthyphro, nor is the "pious" the same as the "dear to the gods," but they are distinct from one another. How so?

A circular library stamp of the Bodleian Library is visible here, reading: "Library of the Bodleian."

Because we agree that the pioushosion is loved because it is pious, but it is not pious because it is loved? Yes. But the dear to the godstheophiles, because it is loved by the gods, is "dear to the gods" by this very act of being loved; it is not loved because it is "dear to the gods"? You speak truly. But if they were the same, my dear Euthyphro—the "dear to the gods" and the "pious"—if the pious were loved because it is pious, then the "dear to the gods" would also be loved because it is "dear to the gods"; and if the "dear to the gods" were "dear to the gods" because it is loved by the gods, then the pious would also be pious because it is loved. But now you see that they are in opposite states, as being entirely different from each other: the one original: "τὸ μὲν" is of a nature to be loved because it is loved; the other original: "τὸ δὲ" is loved because it is worthy of being loved.

And you are likely, Euthyphro, when asked what the pioushosion truly is, to be unwilling to reveal its essenceousia to me, but instead to tell me some affectpathos concerning it—namely, that it has this "affect" of being loved by all the gods; but what it is in its nature, you have not yet said. If you are willing, then, do not hide it from me, but say again from the beginning what the pious is...