Commentary on Plato's Alcibiades

...then the problem and no less in syllogisms to know oneself looking at the goal to know the god-like and the good which is of the whole of the intention; it is necessary, therefore, just as we said in them about the theologians, for each to have what is necessary how; and in them indeed the power will depart remaining proportional in them; but the matter; but the soul; but the opinion; but to them the underlying nature; and it is said commonly to these indeed good, but that with which it will be completed, the mixture of fullness, thus it must be; but the I, to know oneself; but the soul by some divine demonstration? for all to tend toward the same, the conclusion; and everything, so to speak, as a whole as that of the dialogue; but the character of the speech is unclear; and of the shapes; and the variety of the ideas which is of the angelic requirement; but the matter is the persons and the time; and the so-called paralyzed hypothesis. But the proposed thing having ceased in every dialogue; the goal indeed is, but the writing is rather to know the essence for us. And we happen to be lovers of this knowledge, so that we may be fortunate with a better one; and just as in the sensible things themselves it was not necessary to [know] all things; thus indeed and in them being equalized since gods are similarly yoked to the divine of the essence. And the end is what we said; let it cease also concerning the intention, unless it is written by those having demonstrated beforehand that the beginning of our own perfection is from our own pure knowledge; but the dialogue is the beginning of the intellect.