P R E F A C E .

consequence. The pursuit of a defeated army does not extend beyond two, three, or four leagues at most; because the enemy's neighboring places stop the victors, provide retreat to the vanquished, prevent them from being totally ruined, and ensure that, under the shelter of their ramparts, they reorganize in a short time; while on the other hand, they force the victorious army to be content with its superiority for the rest of the campaign, or at most, with the capture of one place, which costs it dearly, weakens it considerably, and gives the enemies the leisure to return to the campaign and occupy certain posts that set limits to the progress of the conqueror. But in those vast countries where there are no, or only very few, fortified places, the victors push the defeated army until it is entirely dissipated; which is ordinarily followed by the sacking of the provinces, which find themselves thereby forced to receive the law of the conqueror. This is precisely what Alexander did, who, by means of three battles, made himself master of the formidable monarchy of the Persians; and one sees the same thing in Caesar, when he had conquered the Gauls; for after the gain of one or two battles, he seized all the countries where he carried the war. Not to go back so far, was not Spain conquered by the Moors after