SCHOLIA, WITH GOD’S HELP, FROM THE LECTURES OF STEPHANUS THE PHILOSOPHER

ON ARISTOTLE’S "ON INTERPRETATION"

page 16a1

First, one must define what a noun is and what a verb is. Next, what is a negation and an affirmation, and a statement and speech, and so forth.

The present treatise has a two-part introduction. In the first part, the author lists those very things he intends to discuss in the first section, and he also provides a certain principle original: "theorema" — a fundamental rule or logical observation. In the second part,
10 he explains a certain analogy a structural correspondence or relationship between spoken sounds and concepts. Regarding the list, he says that one must first define what a noun original: "onoma" — can mean "name" or "subject" is and what a verb original: "rhema" — a word carrying time or action is, then what a negation, an affirmation, a statement, and speech original: "logos" — sentence, discourse, or reason are. This is the list itself. The principle, however, is as follows: though there are four elements—written letters, spoken sounds, concepts, and objects—two of these exist by nature, while the other
15 two exist by convention original: "thesei" — established by human agreement rather than natural law. He demonstrates this in the following way: written letters and nouns are not the same for everyone; but things that are not the same for everyone do not exist by nature; therefore, letters and nouns do not exist by nature. Now, it is self-evident and agreed upon that nouns and letters are not the same for everyone. For the style of letters among the Greeks is one thing, and among the Egyptians it is another.
20 Furthermore, nouns function in the same way: for the Greeks use certain names—let us say, for a "horse" or a "dog"—while the Egyptians and Romans use others, and every other nation uses still others. That things which are not the same for everyone exist by convention and not by nature is also clear; for if they existed by nature, they would have to be the same for everyone, as nature produces the same effect everywhere. But that
25 concepts original: "noemata" — the mental images or thoughts and objects original: "pragmata" — the actual things in the world are the same for everyone, and for this reason exist by nature, is evident. For an Egyptian does not have one concept regarding a horse while a Greek has another; they have the same concept. And again, the object—the horse—is not one thing for some and something else for others, but is the same for everyone.

3 Beginning—Lecture 1: I have added this based on the similarity of other chapter titles.
P: added in the margin by a second hand (P²).

5 and statement: omitted in some manuscripts.
10 explains: reading from manuscript P.