STEPHANUS ON "ON INTERPRETATION" [Aristotle page 16a1, line 3]

p. 16a1 ...then what is negation and affirmation. It is reasonable that he placed the noun and the verb before these; for he says they are "simpler." But why did he place the "inferior" before the "superior"? For example, why place negation before affirmation, and affirmation before assertion, apophansis: a statement that affirms or denies something of something else and assertion before the sentence original: "logos"? We say, then, that he has done this reasonably, because he made the "limit" of what preceded the "beginning" of what follows.
5 Since he has arrived at the "sentence," he begins to discuss it—first, so that he might make his teaching continuous, and second, because in the definition of assertion he mentions the sentence, and in the definition of affirmation and negation he mentions assertion. Those things taken
10 in the definition of something are intended to be more "known" than the thing being defined.

That there are three primary modes of division we have already learned:
folio 38r as a genus into species, as a whole into parts, or as a homonymous word homonymos: a single word with multiple, distinct meanings into different significations. It is agreed that assertion is the more universal term and is divided into affirmation and negation; but we must investigate by which mode
15 it is divided. That it is impossible to divide it as a "whole into parts" is immediately agreed upon. For it was said that things cut as a whole into parts are divided either into homeomerous parts homeomeres: "uniform parts" where the parts share the name and nature of the whole, like flesh or water (as flesh into pieces of flesh and bone into pieces of bone) or into anhomeomerous parts
20</ some as Socrates is divided into hands, feet, and head. The homeomerous parts accept both the name and the definition of the whole, and also of each other, but the anhomeomerous do not. Therefore, assertion cannot be divided as a whole into parts, neither as homeomerous nor as anhomeomerous. It cannot be as homeomerous because even if the divided parts accept the name of the whole (for the affirmation is called an assertion in itself, and the negation likewise),
25 nevertheless, they do not accept the name and definition of each other; for the negation is not called an affirmation, nor is the affirmation called a negation. Furthermore, they do not accept the definition of one another. Nor is it cut as if into anhomeomerous parts. For it was said that anhomeomerous parts do not accept the name of the whole; for no one
30 calls the foot, the head, or the hand of Socrates "Socrates." Yet here, as we said, both the negation and the affirmation are called assertions by the name of the whole. Thus, assertion cannot be divided into affirmation and negation as a whole into parts. It remains debated, then, whether it is as a genus into species (as Porphyry Porphyry of Tyre (c. 234–305 AD), a Neoplatonist philosopher and influential commentator on Aristotle. thinks) or as a homonymous word into different meanings (as Alexander Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 AD), the most famous of the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle. suggested). When Aristotle defines each of them, we shall, by presenting the arguments of both
35 commentators, judge between them as best we can.

p. 16a3 Now, those things in the voice. He said "in the voice" in order to signify nouns and verbs; for these are not simply "sounds," but are "in the voice" This implies they are articulated sounds produced by the soul to signify something, rather than mere noise.. This is why he did not say "voices are symbols of the affections in the soul," but rather "those things in the voice."