STEPHANUS ON THE BOOK "ON INTERPRETATION" [Aristotle pages 16a9. 12. 14. 18. 19]

...marks are symbols of thoughts. Likenesses original: "homoiomata" and symbols original: "symbola" differ in this respect: a likeness is modeled after the thing itself as much as possible. For example, a portrait of Socrates—a likeness—tries to reproduce the very character and features of Socrates to the best of its ability, showing him as pot-bellied, bug-eyed, and bald, 5 and so on, insofar as it is possible to paint and liken it to Socrates. A symbol, however, is not like this. For it is within our power to create a symbol of war, whatever we might wish—such as the throwing of a torch or the raising of a spear, and such things. It is not up to the painter to create a likeness in just any way he pleases, but rather according to how the model actually is. It is reasonable, then, that Aristotle spoke of "likenesses" in the case of thoughts, because it is impossible for me to think of a horse in one way and for someone else to think of it in another i.e., the mental concept of a horse is dictated by the nature of the horse itself; 10 but as for names, since it is possible for me to signify a thing through one name and for someone else to signify it through another, he reasonably called them "symbols."

p. 16a9: Just as in the soul there is sometimes a thought without 15 truth or falsity. Here begins the second part of the introduction, in which, as we said, he provides the analogy analogy: a proportion or similarity of relations between vocal sounds and thoughts. An analogy is a similarity of proportions, such as "this is to this as that is to that"—for instance, as a simple thought is to a simple vocal sound. Just as in a simple thought there f. 39v is no truth or falsity, so it is in a simple vocal sound; 20 and just as in a composite original: "syntheto" thought there is always truth or falsity, so too in a composite statement. In this resides the analogy.

p. 16a12: For falsity and truth involve combination and division. It should be known that he calls affirmation "combination" original: "synthesin", because the predicate is combined with the subject; and he calls negation "division" original: "diairesin", 25 because the predicate is divided from the subject by the word "not."

p. 16a14: As for instance "man" or "white." It should be known that "white" is a noun—specifically a declinable noun—and yet he took it as a verb. For we said that when a word occupies the rank of a predicate, whether it is a noun or a verb, it is called a "verb" In logical analysis, the predicate provides the "action" or "attribute" of the proposition.
30 p. 16a18: Either simply or according to time. By "simply" he means the present tense; by "according to time" he means the tenses surrounding the present, such as the past and the future. These are what action possesses.

Lecture 2. Concerning the Noun.

p. 16a19: A noun, then, is a vocal sound, significant by convention, 35 without time, of which no part is significant in isolation.

As for why he placed the noun before the verb, we have already given the reason. He defines the noun—or rather, sketches it—in this manner:

Critical Apparatus
1 they differ] compare Ammonius, folio 17v
2 as much as possible] P omits "possible"
Ammonius says: "it wishes to be depicted as much as possible according to the nature of the thing"
4 "as"] I have added this word
5 insofar as] P2 writes "as if"
14 sometimes] P accentuates differently
16 analogy] compare Ammonius, folio 22v
23 it should be known etc.] compare Ammonius, folio 23r
27 it] apparently written "not it" in P