STEPHANUS ON THE BOOK "ON INTERPRETATION" [Aristotle page 16a 19-20]

...if it were separated, it signifies something as being a part of the man. This was said to distinguish names from phrases that do not contain verbs, such as:

original: "ὦ μάκαρ Ἀτρείδη, μοιραγενές, ὀλβιόδαιμον" — Iliad 3.182

and

5

original: "αἲ γάρ, Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἄπολλον" — Iliad 2.371

and

original: "ναὶ μὰ τόδε σκῆπτρον" — Iliad 1.234

For in these cases, the other conditions are the same: it is a vocal sound, significant by convention, and without time; but here, a part when separated does signify something, either a quality or existence or something of that sort. 10 Therefore, to distinguish a name from such phrases, he said "of which no part is significant when separated."

By introducing the idea of a "defined nature," he spoke regarding the term not-man. original: "ouk anthrōpos" For this term has all the other characteristics of a name, but because it does not introduce a specific defined substance, it is not strictly a name. For while it denies one thing, 15 it introduces many others—or rather, infinite and indefinite things.

Furthermore, Aristotle demonstrates with an abundance of evidence and "from the greater case" that the part of a name, when separated, is not significant. For if in compound names—for example, in the name Kallippos literally "Fair-horse" or in the word epaktrokeles a pirate-skiff—where the separated parts provide a certain hint or mental image 20 of something else (as in Kallippos, the part ippos horse when separated signifies the irrational, neighing animal; and in epaktrokeles, the part keles racer or riding-horse signifies a single-yoked horse, though an epaktrokeles is actually a type of pirate vessel, which Aeschines mentions when he says "he makes him embark upon the pirate-skiff"), if, then, in these compound names the part when separated 25 signifies nothing, this is even more true for simple names.

For just as in the compound the word "horse" signified nothing, so too when it is torn away from its proper wholeness—even if it provides a mental image—it nevertheless signifies nothing when spoken as a part of that name. And here ends the description of the name. As for the questions remaining, some concern the text itself | f. 41r while others belong to a different inquiry, which we shall learn God willing.

30 A name, then, is... [p. 16a19]
Some ask why Aristotle, having already discussed simple vocal sounds in the Categories, discusses them again here; for names and verbs are simple sounds. We reply that "simple sound," "name," "verb," "statement," and "term"—these five things—do not differ in their underlying subject matter, but only in their relationship. For example, man 35 is called a "simple sound" insofar as it is simply significant of something; it is called a "name" insofar as it is a subject; it is called a "verb" insofar as it is a predicate; and it is called a "part"...