STEPHANUS ON THE BOOK "ON INTERPRETATION" [Aristotle page 16a33]

Therefore, if this is absurd, we must adopt the opinion of the Peripatetics The followers of Aristotle, known for walking about while discussing philosophy.: that there are four cases, but the "direct" form should be called the name. Aristotle says, then, that such cases differ from the name in this regard: the name, when joined folio 42v with "was" or "is" or "will be," is always either true or false, but the cases are not. As the philosopher Porphyry noted, the "is," "was," and "will be" are mentioned only in regard to these existential verbs and no longer in regard to other verbs. For other verbs, when joined with the cases, become immediately ungrammatical; for no one says, "Of Socrates walks" original: "Sōkratous peripatei"; "Socrates" is in the genitive case ("of Socrates"), making the sentence nonsensical in both Greek and English.. Hence, he also records here the classification of the Stoics: that a predicate is predicated either of a name—that is, the direct case—or of an oblique case.

If it is predicated of a name, it produces either a complete or an incomplete statement. If it produces a complete statement, they call it a predicate original: "katēgorēma" or a contingency original: "symbama". They use both terms for the same thing, and the reason is clear: they call it a "predicate" because it is declared—that is, said and predicated—of the subject; they call it a "contingency" because the act of "walking" happened to Socrates The Stoics viewed a completed action as an "event" or "contingency" that meets the subject..

But if it produces an incomplete statement, it is called a sub-predicate or a sub-contingency, such as "Socrates loves"; for it lacks an object e.g., "Socrates loves... someone.". If, on the other hand, it is predicated of a case i.e., the subject is in the genitive or dative case., it either produces a complete statement gap in text? or a "lesser than a predicate," such as "Socrates repents" original: "tō Sōkratei metamelei"; in Greek, "repents" is an impersonal verb taking the dative case "to/for Socrates.". Or, it produces an incomplete statement, and they call this "lesser than a sub-predicate" or "lesser than a sub-contingency," such as "It concerns Socrates"; for it lacks a reference, such as "concerning Alcibiades" or someone else original: "Sōkratei melei"; "It matters to Socrates [about X]." This requires both a dative and a genitive to be complete..

The logic of these cases is, therefore, the same as the others in most respects; however, when joined with "is," "was," or "will be," they are neither true nor false. But some people wonder why he did not provide the whole definition from the beginning, but instead added "not-man"—that is, the indefinite name—and the cases later. We say, then, that since "name" signifies many things for Aristotle (for it indicates the direct case, the oblique cases, the indefinite name, the verb, and the subject), by saying "a signifying voice by convention," folio 43r he indicated all of these.

But by adding "and not signifying time," he excluded verbs, while the rest remained—that is, the indefinite names and the cases. Again, by saying "introducing a definite nature," he excluded only the indefinite names. Finally, by saying "and being true or false when joined with 'was' or 'is' or 'will be'," he pushed away the cases. Thus, the complete definition of the name is this: "a signifying voice by convention, not signifying time, of which no part is significant in isolation, introducing a definite nature, which joined with 'was' or 'is' or 'will be' [is true or false]."