Problems Concerning First Principles

But if this is the case, the principle would not be with all things, but outside of all things, as the principle of the things proceeding from it. But if that other case original: "ἐκεῖνο" holds, what would it be that proceeds from all things, as from a principle, and exists outside all things toward the lower things, as a product of all things? For this, too, is among all things, since the concept of "all things" simply leaves nothing out. Therefore, "all things" are neither a principle nor from a principle.

Furthermore, how are all things seen together in a multiplicity? And with what distinction? For we do not conceive of the "all" without these things. How then did some distinction and multiplicity appear immediately? Or are all things everywhere in distinction and multiplicity? page 2, Hamburg Codex Is the One the summit of the many, and the Monad original: "μονάς" the summit of the unified things that have been distinguished, and is the One still simpler than the Monad? But, in the first place, the Monad is all number, even if it is still contracted. Therefore, in this way, the Monad is also "all things." And then, the One is not one of the many. For if it were, it would also fill up the many, just like each of the other things. But as many things as there are in the many by some kind of division, that One is just as many before that division, according to that which is everywhere partless. For it is not "one" as a minimum, as Speusippus original: "Σπεύσιππος" seemed to say. But it is "one" as that which has swallowed up original: "καταπιόν" all things. For by its own