Timaeus

INTRODUCTION.

Sokrates. § 14. We are not concerned with the question of whether Sokrates was a sophist or not. Furthermore, despite the deep mark he left on his time, we need not linger long with him since our inquiry deals with metaphysics; whatever metaphysical importance Sokrates possesses is indirect and can be summarized in a few words. For Sokrates, the ultimate object of inquiry is not the facts provided by experience, but our judgments concerning them. While the physicists thought to attain knowledge by speculating upon natural phenomena themselves, Sokrates substituted concepts for things as the object of knowledge by proceeding inductively to classify and define various groups of phenomena. By comparing a number of particulars that fall under the same class, we are enabled to strip away any accidental attributes they may possess and retain only what is common and essential to all. Thus, we arrive at the concept or universal notion of the thing. Since this universal is the sole truth regarding the thing—as far as we can reach truth—it follows that only universals are the objects of knowledge. This Socratic doctrine, that knowledge concerns universals, is the germ of the Platonic principle concerning the knowledge of ideas. Although, as we shall see, a too-strict adherence to it led Plato astray at first, it remained a substantial contribution to philosophical research, given that a Plato existed to develop it.

Plato: two stages to be distinguished in his treatment of the metaphysical problem. § 15. We are now in a position to appreciate the nature of the work that lay before Plato and the materials he found ready to hand. We have seen that philosophy, properly speaking, did not yet exist, although its uncombined elements were ready for synthesis. Now, it would be highly improbable to suppose that Plato realized the full magnitude and exact nature of the problem he faced at first sight; a careful study of his works leads me to the conclusion that such a supposition is indefensible¹. If this is the case—if Plato initially dealt with the question incompletely and with only a partial knowledge of his task, but later revised and partly remodeled his theory after fully realizing the nature of the problem—

Footnote: ¹ For a full statement of the reasons for holding that two well-defined phases of thought are to be found in Plato's dialogues, I must refer to Dr. Jackson's essays on the later theory of ideas.