Fragments of the Early Stoics, Volume 3: Chrysippus (Ethics)

...living in accordance with both one’s own nature and the nature of the whole, performing none of the things that the common law is accustomed to forbid, which is the right reason, pervading all things, being the same as Zeus, who is the leader of this administration of existing things. And that this very thing is the virtue of the happy person and the smooth flow of life, when all things are performed according to the harmony of the spirit daimōn divine spirit/inner self in each person with the will of the administrator of the whole.
Ibid. 89. Chrysippus interprets nature, in accordance with which one must live, as both the common nature and specifically human nature.

5 Commentaries on Lucan, book II 380, p. 73 Us. By these verses he declared that Cato was a Stoic: whose philosophy's end, according to Chrysippus, is that one: "to live in agreement with nature," which is: to live congruently with nature.

6 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata V 14, p. 703 Pott. Hence the Stoics have said that the end of philosophy is to live in agreement with nature.

7 Philo, On the Planting of Noah § 49, Vol. II p. 143, 20 Wendl. For the ancients said that the end of happiness is to be able to live in accordance with nature.

8 Philo, On the Migration of Abraham § 128, Vol. II p. 293, 4 Wendl. This is the end sung by those who have philosophized best: to live in agreement with nature.

9 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata II, p. 482 Pott. Hence the Stoics also dogmatized that living in agreement with nature is the end, renaming God inappropriately as nature, since nature extends even to plants and stones.

10 Philo, On Moses, book III Vol. II Mang. p. 158. Seeking the highest happiness and the end, towards which it is necessary to hasten and to refer all actions, aiming like a target in archery for the goal regarding life.

11 Cicero, On Ends III 23. And just as our limbs were given to us so that it appears they were given for a certain method of living, so the appetite of the mind, which is called hormē impulse in Greek, seems to have been given not for just any kind of life, but for a certain form of living, and likewise also reason and perfect reason. 24. For just as a certain action is given to an actor, and not just any movement to a dancer, but a specific one, so life must be conducted according to a certain kind, not just any; which kind we call convenient and consistent. For we do not think wisdom is similar to navigation or medicine, but rather to that action I just mentioned, and to dancing, so that the end, which is the fulfillment of the art, resides within the thing itself and is not sought from outside. And yet there is also another dissimilarity of wisdom from these arts, because in those arts, while there are things that are done rightly, they do not nevertheless contain all the parts of which they consist; whereas those things which they call katorthōmata right actions contain all the parts of virtue. For wisdom alone is turned entirely upon itself. 25. For wisdom embraces both greatness of mind and justice, and judges all things that happen to a person as being below itself.