Fragments of the Early Stoics, Volume 3: Chrysippus (Ethics)

12 Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato V 6 (168) p. 450 M. Not satisfied with these, Posidonius attacks the followers of Chrysippus more clearly and vehemently, as not correctly explaining the end. The passage stands as follows: "Passing over these things, some restrict 'living in agreement' to 'doing everything possible for the sake of the first things according to nature,' making it similar to setting as a target pleasure or the absence of trouble or something else of that kind. But it is something that displays conflict in its very expression, and contains nothing noble or happy. For it follows necessarily from the end, but it is not the end. But even if this is correctly grasped, one may use it to resolve the puzzles that the sophists propose, but certainly not the phrase 'living in accordance with the experience of the things that happen according to the whole of nature,' which is equivalent to saying 'living in agreement,' when this does not mean, in a trivial way, attaining things that are indifferent."

Stobaeus, Eclogues II 76, 3 W. For Cleanthes, who was the first to take over his (Zeno's) school, added "in accordance with nature," and thus rendered it: "The end is to live in agreement with nature." Which Chrysippus, wishing to make clearer, expressed in this manner: "to live in accordance with experience of the things that happen by nature," etc.

13 Cicero, On Ends IV 14. For when earlier thinkers, among whom Polemo is the clearest, had said that living according to nature is the highest good, the Stoics say that three things are signified by these words: one of this kind, "living while applying the knowledge of those things which happen by nature." They say that this very definition is Zeno's, declaring what was said by you, "living conveniently with nature." They say the second signifies the same as if one were to say, "living while keeping all or most intermediate duties." 15. This as explained is dissimilar to the former. For the former is a right action (which you called katorthōma right action) and befalls the wise man alone; the latter belongs to a certain kind of incipient duty, not a perfect one, which can fall to some foolish people. The third, however, is living while enjoying all or the greatest things that are according to nature. This is not placed in our action; for it is completed both from that kind of life which enjoys virtue and from those things which are according to nature and are not in our power. But this highest good, which is understood in the third sense, and that life which is led from the highest good, because virtue is joined to it, falls only to the wise man, and this end of goods, as we see written by the Stoics themselves, was established by Xenocrates and Aristotle.

14 Cicero, On Ends II 34. Following from all these whom I have mentioned are the ends of goods: for Aristippus, simple pleasure; for the Stoics, to agree with nature, which they want to be 'from virtue,' that is, to live honestly; which they interpret thus: to live with the intelligence of those things which happen by nature, choosing those things which are according to nature, and rejecting their opposites.