Fragments of the Early Stoics, Volume 3: Chrysippus (Ethics)

26 Plutarch, On Common Conceptions ch. 27 p. 1071f. For you see that Chrysippus also drives Ariston into this difficulty, as if things do not allow for the conceiving of indifference toward what is neither good nor evil, if the good and the evil have not been conceived beforehand. For in this way its indifference would appear to pre-exist, if it is not possible to obtain an understanding of it without the good having been conceived first, and nothing else exists but the good itself.

27 Cicero, On Ends IV 25, 68. For when it is confirmed that what is honorable is the only good, the care of health, diligence in family affairs, the administration of the republic, the order of conducting business, and the duties of life are removed. Finally, that very honorable thing, in which alone you wish all things to be, must be abandoned. These things are most diligently said by Chrysippus against Ariston.

28 Galen, On the Diagnosis of the Passions of the Soul 4 Vol. V p. 77 K. The beginning, therefore, of many errors is the false assumption regarding the end of each life; for errors regarding particular things grow from this as if from a root. One can, while not being mistaken in the opinion regarding the end, be mistaken in one of the particular things, not understanding the consequence.

§ 3. That only the honorable is good.

29 Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions ch. 13 p. 1039c. And indeed, in his work On the Honorable, toward the proof that only the honorable is good, he uses such arguments: "The good is choiceworthy; that which is choiceworthy is pleasing; that which is pleasing is praiseworthy; that which is praiseworthy is honorable." And again, "The good is joyous; that which is joyous is noble/venerable; that which is noble is honorable."

30 Diogenes Laërtius VII 101. They say that only the honorable is good, as Hecato says in his third book On Goods, and Chrysippus in his works On the Honorable. And this is virtue and that which partakes of virtue; to which it is equal that all good is honorable, and that the good is equivalent to the honorable; which is equal to this. For since it is a good, it is honorable; and it is honorable; therefore, it is a good.

31 Philo, On the Posterity of Cain § 133 Vol. II p. 29, 7 Wendl. mentions: the Stoic doctrine that only the honorable is good.

32 Alexander of Aphrodisias, Quaestiones I 14 p. 26 Bruns. That nothing besides...