Fragments of the Early Stoics, Volume 3: Chrysippus (Ethics)

original: "DE FINE BONORUM."

41 Cicero, On Ends III 36. That everything which is honorable is to be sought for its own sake—this is the opinion most to be defended—by the Stoics. 38. And in the same way, base things are to be shunned for their own sake. 39. But when we say that folly, timidity, injustice, and intemperance are to be shunned because of those things which arise from them, we do not say it in such a way that this discourse seems to conflict with that which is posited, namely, that only that which is base is evil, because these are not referred to the discomfort of the body, but to base actions which arise from vices. For what the Greeks call kakías vices, I prefer to call vices rather than malice.

42 Cicero, On Laws I 14, 40. But if punishment, not nature, ought to deter men from injustice, what anxiety would trouble the impious, once the fear of punishments was removed? Of whom, however, no one was ever so bold as not to either deny that the crime had been committed by him, or to invent some cause for his just grief, and to seek a defense of his crime from some law of nature. If the impious dare to call upon these, with what zeal, pray, will they be honored by the good? — But if punishment, if the fear of penalty, not the baseness itself, deters from an unjust and criminal life, no one is unjust, and the wicked should rather be considered imprudent. 41. But, moreover, those who are not moved by the honorable itself, so that we may be good men, but by some utility and profit, are cunning, not good. For what will that man do in the dark, who fears nothing but a witness and a judge? What will he do in a desert, in a place where he has found a weak and solitary person whom he can rob of much gold? Our man, indeed, who is just and good by nature, will even converse, will help, will lead him on the way: but he who will do nothing for the sake of another, and measures everything by his own advantages, you surely see what he is about to do. And if he denies that he will take that man’s life and steal his gold, he will never deny it for the reason that he judges it base by nature, but because he fears that it might emerge, that is, that he might have an evil.

43 Cicero, On Laws I 18, 48. It follows—that both law and everything honorable are to be sought of their own accord. For all good men love equity itself and law itself, and it is not the way of a good man to err and to cherish that which should not be cherished for its own sake. Therefore, law is both to be sought and cultivated for its own sake. And if law, then also justice: if justice, then the remaining virtues are also to be cultivated for their own sake. What? Is liberality gratuitous or mercenary? If he is kind without a reward, it is gratuitous: if with a reward, it is hired: nor is there any doubt that he who is called liberal or kind follows duty, not profit. Therefore, likewise, justice seeks no reward, no price. It is therefore sought for its own sake. —— 49. Where is that holy friendship, if the friend himself is not loved for his own sake with the whole heart, as it is said? —— But if friendship is to be cultivated for its own sake, then also the fellowship of men and equality and justice are to be sought for their own sake.

44 Cicero, On Ends V 20 Antiochus recounting the Carneadean division of tôn telôn the ends. But the Stoics say that to do everything so that we may attain those things which are in accordance with nature, even if we do not achieve them, is both honorable and the only thing to be sought for its own sake and the only good.