Fragments of the Early Stoics, Volume 3: Chrysippus (Ethics)

original: "DE FINE BONORUM."

45 Servius on Aeneid I 604. And a mind conscious to itself of right: according to the Stoics, who say that virtue itself is [given] as a reward, even if there are no [other] rewards.

46 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata IV 8 p. 594 Pott. If some of the indifferent things have obtained such honor that they seem to be choiceworthy even for some unwilling [people], much more should virtue be considered something to be struggled for: not looking to anything else, but to the very fact that it can be done well, whether it seems so to some others or not.

47 Lactantius, Divine Institutes III 12. But even the Stoics — — deny that anyone can be made happy without virtue. Therefore, a happy life is the reward of virtue, if virtue, as has been rightly said, makes a happy life. Virtue, therefore, is not, as they say, to be sought for its own sake, etc. Cf. ibid. ch. 27.

48 Lactantius, Divine Institutes V 17. For even when they dispute about virtue, although they understand it is full of distresses and miseries, nevertheless they say it is to be sought for its own sake.

§ 5. That virtue is sufficient for a happy life.

49 Diogenes Laërtius VII 127. And that it virtue is sufficient for happiness, as Zeno says, and Chrysippus in the first book On Virtues, and Hecato in the second On Goods. For if, he says, magnanimity is sufficient to make one superior to all things, and it is a part of virtue, then virtue is also sufficient for happiness, despising even things that seem troublesome.

50 Porphyrio on Horace, Odes III 2, 17. These things are from the Stoic sect, who say that virtue alone is sufficient for a happy life.

51 Cicero, On Ends I 61. And this is much better and truer for us that is, the Epicureans than for the Stoics. For they deny that there is any good except that certain shadow of theirs, which they call by the name "honorable," a name more splendid than solid; and they say that virtue, leaning on this honorable thing, requires no pleasure and is content with itself for living happily.

52 Proclus on Plato’s Timaeus p. 61 B. Schn. Not as those from the Stoa say that the virtuous man needs nothing from fortune, so also [does] Plato.

53 Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions ch. 26 p. 1046 d. If, then, he Chrysippus thought that prudence was a good productive of happiness, like Epicurus, he would not contradict himself; but since prudence is not different from happiness according to him, but is happiness, etc.

54 Plutarch, On Common Conceptions 8 p. 1061 f. Therefore, not only these things do they say...