Fragments of the Early Stoics, Volume 3: Chrysippus (Ethics)

...the men say, but also those things in addition to these, that

“Time does not increase the good by its passing, but even if someone becomes wise for a brief moment of an hour, he will fall short in no way regarding happiness compared to one who spends a lifetime using virtue and living blissfully within it.”

5 Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, ch. 26, p. 1046c. Having said in many places that is, Chrysippus that they are no happier over a longer time, but in the same way and equally to those who have participated in happiness for an indivisible amount of time.

Stobaeus, Eclogues II 98, 17 W. For which reason the good are always happy in every way, and the base are wretched. And 10 Chrysippus says that the happiness of the good does not differ from divine happiness, and that even happiness lasting for an indivisible moment does not differ from the happiness of Zeus, that the happiness of Zeus is in no way more choiceworthy, nor more beautiful, nor more venerable than that of wise men.

Themistius, Oration VIII, p. 101d. Chrysippus seems to be posturing merely in words, claiming that one day, or rather even one hour, has the same power for a virtuous man as many years.

55 Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, ch. 18, p. 1042a. He Chrysippus declares vice to be the substance of wretchedness, writing in every physical and ethical book, and insisting that living according to vice is the same as living wretchedly.

56 Gellius, Attic Nights XVIII 1, 4. Yet the Stoic there was of the opinion that a happy life could be produced for a man by the virtue of the mind alone, and the greatest misery by malice alone, even if all other goods, which are called bodily and external, were lacking to virtue, and were present to malice there follows the response of the Peripatetic. 6. The Stoic protested at this point and expressed wonder, as if the other were positing two distinct things. He wondered that, since malice and virtue are two contraries, and a wretched and a happy life are likewise contraries, the man did not maintain the force and nature of a contrary in both cases, and thought that malice alone was strong enough to produce a wretched life, but said that virtue alone was not sufficient to provide a happy life. And he said that this was the greatest discrepancy and inconsistency: that a man who claims that a life cannot by any means be made happy if virtue alone is absent, at the same time denies the opposite, that a life becomes happy when virtue alone is present, and takes away from virtue when it is present and sought the same honor that he grants and holds for virtue when it is absent.

35 57 Alexander, Mantissa to the Book On the Soul, p. 166, 21 Bruns. Furthermore, not:

“If we see well by the virtue of that by which we see, and we hear well by the virtue of that by which we hear, and for this reason we live well by the virtue of that by which we live, then the virtue of the soul would be happiness; for we live by the soul.”
Not for this reason, etc.

40 58 Seneca, Letter 85, 2. He who is prudent is also temperate, he who is temperate is also constant. He who is constant is undisturbed. He who is undisturbed is without sadness. He who is without sadness is happy: therefore the prudent man is happy, and prudence is sufficient for a happy life.
Ibid. 24. He who is brave is without fear. He who is without fear is without sadness. He who is without sadness is happy.