Fragments of the Early Stoics, Volume 3: Chrysippus (Ethics)

...without sadness is happy: therefore the prudent man is happy, and prudence is sufficient for a happy life.
Ibid. 24. He who is brave is without fear. He who is without fear is without sadness. He who is without sadness is happy.

5 59 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations V 48. Now, how can a good man not refer everything he does and thinks to that which is praiseworthy? But he refers everything to living happily. Therefore, a happy life is praiseworthy. And nothing is praiseworthy without virtue. Therefore, a happy life is achieved by virtue.
49. And this is also concluded as follows: There is nothing boastworthy or worth glorifying in a wretched life, nor in that which is neither wretched nor happy. And there is something in some life that is boastworthy and worth glorifying and displaying. — — 50. If this , a happy life is to be glorified and boasted of and displayed; for there is nothing else that should be boasted of and displayed. With these points established, you understand what follows.
15 And indeed, unless that life is happy which is also honorable, it is necessary that there be something else better than a happy life; for whatever is honorable, they will certainly admit is better. Thus, a happy life will be something better; than which what can be said to be more perverse?

60 Cicero, On Ends III 43. Nor is even that consistent — that he who has more of those things which are highly esteemed in the body should be happier. — For since it is agreed that even a frequency of those goods which we truly call goods does not make life happier or more choiceworthy or more valuable, certainly a multitude of bodily comforts pertains less to a happy life. 44. For if both wisdom and health were to be choiceworthy, the combination of both would be more choiceworthy than wisdom alone; yet, if both are worthy of estimation, the combination is not worth more than wisdom itself separately. For we who judge health to be worthy of some estimation, but do not place it among goods, also think that there is no estimation so great that it is to be preferred to virtue. — — 45. For just as the light of a lamp is obscured and overwhelmed by the light of the sun, and just as a drop of honey is lost in the magnitude of the Aegean Sea, and as an addition of a few pennies to the riches of Croesus and a single step on the road from here to India , thus, when this is the end of goods as the Stoics say, all that estimation of bodily things must necessarily be obscured, overwhelmed, and destroyed by the splendor and magnitude of virtue.

61 Cicero, On Ends IV 30 (Antiochus arguing against the Stoics): so that the Stoics seem to me to be joking at times in this, when they say, “if a flask or a scraper tools used by bathers to scrape the skin were added to that life which is lived with virtue, the wise man would choose that life, to which these have been added, and yet would not be happier on that account.”

62 Alexander, On Aristotle’s Topics, p. 211, 9. In this way, each of the things called indifferent and preferred by the younger Stoics could be shown to be both choiceworthy and a good; for each of them, when added to virtue, makes the whole more choiceworthy for the virtuous man. For a life according to virtue is more choiceworthy if it is accompanied by health, and if accompanied by wealth, and if accompanied by good reputation; for choiceworthy and avoidable things are judged by the choice and avoidance of the virtuous man.