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nature apt to be modeled, and the aptitude to be modeled is, so to speak, a part of the nature of the bronze. But if the hyparxis is identical to the cause, how is one of the generations homogeneous similar and the other anhomogeneous? It is because every generation according to hyparxis is homogeneous, and every generation that is not purely according to hyparxis, but is according to a hyparxis inclining toward the generation of a different thing, is anhomogeneous. For the cause, undoubtedly, is nothing other than hyparxis inclining toward difference, and, by that very fact, becoming productive of the different, whereas the hyparxis that remains in itself Without leaning toward differentiation. is productive of the same. Now, even the homogeneous generation, if the hyparxis—purely as hyparxis—did not incline toward difference, could not be generated; for it is a universal principle that the generator is the cause of the generated. In what, then, does the cause differ (from the hyparxis), since every cause is an inclination of the generator toward the generated? Would it not be better to say that there is a double hyparxis, one according to homoeomeric having similar parts division, the other according to anhomoeomeric having dissimilar parts division, and this is the division according to breadth? For all that proceeds from the producer is enveloped in it, according to one coagregation original: "συναίρεσιν", which it is necessary to posit as its hyparxis. For all that each individual subject is, all of that is projected from itself, and all produced things are the unfolding, the development original: "ἀνέλιξις" of the coagregation of the producer, just as every number is the evolution original: "προποδισμός" of the monad the singular unity. It is in this way that we name one universal, the others more particular because they partially distribute the extent that embraces the entire whole. How then? Is it not necessary that the animal, purely as animal, embraces all things that are animals, not only according to depth, that is to say, celestial and aerial, aquatic and terrestrial, but also according to breadth,