Compendium of the Study of Theology

said to be co-intellected or connoted by it ; as, when we say "creature," we imply the existence of a Creator ; and, when we say "Creator," we imply God. So an accident implies its subject ; "risible" implies "man" (since no other animal can laugh), etc. It is objected that such signification cannot be univocal, because a word cannot signify two things univocally ; nor can it be equivocal, for that would imply a "new imposition". The answer is that the last principle holds only of names imposed at pleasure (ad placitum), and has no application to cases where the same name signifies more than one thing "by actual concomitance". It is objected that, if Socrates implies a mind, it would follow that, because Socrates is an animal, we might say "Socrates' mind is an animal". Bacon replies by appealing to the old distinction between natural signs and signs by imposition : the connoted meanings cannot be substituted for the primary meaning without a new imposition of the term.

The question of connotation suggests a problem discussed by Aristotle and Averroes : does the name of an "aggregate" or concrete thing "signify" the formal cause of the aggregation (i.e. the meaning of the concrete term) or the constituent elements of the aggregation ; e.g. does the term "house" signify the shelter which enters into the definition of the term (co-operimentum), or the particular stones and wood of which the house is composed ? Aristotle's answer is that it signifies both, but not in the same way. To Bacon this answer is too vague : he supplements it by saying that it signifies the aggregate "primarily and principally," and the form and matter secondarily or mediately (mediante aggregato). It signifies the aggregate by imposition : the matter and form naturally. This view is, however, opposed to that of Averroes, who makes such names signify the form primarily (prius et dignius et principalius), and the aggregate secondarily, on the ground that a name only signifies a thing, so far as it is actual (in actu), and the cause of actual existence in the composite or concrete thing is the form ; and, when two things (denoted by the same name) are related as cause and effect, the name belongs more properly