Compendium of the Study of Theology

seems to feel that the solution is not quite adequate, and promises to deal with it on another occasion. Meanwhile, from the whole discussion he concludes that it is not possible truly to assert "man is an animal" while no man exists.

The last remark is interesting, as it suggests the real identity between these difficulties of Roger Bacon and the modern controversies about the nature of predication. The position of Bacon's opponents reminds us of the modern contention that all universal propositions are really hypothetical. "Trespassers will be prosecuted" does not necessarily imply that any one is trespassing at this minute, or even that any one ever will trespass; it merely asserts a universal connexion between these two universals—trespassing and being prosecuted. The opponents of that doctrine would reply that normally the categorical judgement, "mastodons are animals," would imply the present existence of mastodons—in any case it would imply the past real existence of such animals. It is true that Bacon's problem is the meaning of terms, not of predication; but since he holds that a name always means a thing, the two controversies run into one another. I do not of course mean to suggest that those who maintain that categorical propositions affirm the real existence of the subject push the contention (with Bacon) to the absurd length of asserting that the real existence must be always existence at the present moment. I merely touch upon the matter to show that Bacon's difficulties are precisely the difficulties with which Logic is still endeavouring to grapple.

Chapter V. shows that "a word (vox) can fall from its signification". The argument starts from the two principles: (1) a word means nothing when there is no existing thing which it signifies (Boethius), and (2) when one of two correlatives is destroyed the other is destroyed, e.g., when there is no son, there can be no father. The sign and the thing signified are correlatives: hence when the thing signified ceases to exist, the sign no longer means anything. Moreover, the meaning of names is arbitrary; they are imposed by us and can be changed by us. Thus obsolete forms such as "faxo" (for