NOTE ON WORK FOR BOYS

(Amiens MS. 406, leaves 130 to 154.)¹

"BECAUSE IF COMMON THINGS ARE UNKNOWN, THE ART MUST BE UNKNOWN" original: "QUONIAM IGNORATIS COMMUNIBUS NECESSE EST ARTEM IGNORARE." This is a fundamental principle in medieval education: one must understand basic terms before mastering complex sciences.

In the name of Him and the most excellent Virgin Mary, I shall begin the Work for Boys original: "Opus Puerorum." This was likely an introductory textbook on logic for young students., starting thus: There are two parts to propositions . . . On the truth of propositions.

132 a 1. on signs: words like "all," "none," or "some" that indicate the quantity of a subject in logic. 133 b 2. on the sign "whole." 135 a 1. on the sign "every." 141 b 2. on the infinite.

142 b 2. These things suffice for now regarding signs. The second part of this treatise follows, concerning exclusive words: terms that limit a statement to a specific subject, like "only" or "alone", such as "alone" and "only," and the reason for this has already been stated above.

143 a 1. "only" as an adverb. 136 b 2. "Only two are fewer than only three."

137 a 2. And these things suffice for now regarding exclusive words. Afterward, the text follows with exceptive words: terms that exclude specific cases from a general rule, like "except" or "besides" which except a subject regarding the predicate.

"Every man except Socrates original: "Sortem." This is a common medieval abbreviation for Socrates, used as a placeholder name in logical examples. runs." folio 146 a 1. "Let any man see every other person besides himself."

147 a 1. "Antichrist can differ from himself." 147 b 1. "That Antichrist has been is impossible." Medieval logic often used "Antichrist" as a standard example for a person who does not yet exist but will exist in the future, to test how tense affects the truth of a sentence.

147 b 2. And these things regarding words suffice for now. After this follows the section on syncategoremata: words that do not name things on their own but change the meaning of other words, such as "and," "if," "begins," or "ceases" which arrange the predicate, such as "begins" and "ceases." These words are explained in relation to permanent things in this way . . .

148 a 1. "Socrates ceases to be and does not cease to be." 148 b 1. "Socrates ceases to run, therefore he runs."

148 a 2. I dispatch myself briefly regarding other things . . . "Socrates is now the whitest of men who are."

150 a 1. And these things regarding that statement ("Socrates the whitest . . .") suffice for now. Afterward, a rule is usually assigned that an argument from the accident: a non-essential quality, like being "white" or "sitting," which can change without changing what the thing is to the subject is not valid with this word "ceases" unless it is its own proper accident . . . "Socrates ceases to know nothing, therefore he does not cease to know about ceasing to know nothing."

¹ See page ix, note 3.