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| This entry continues from the previous page. ...regarding the universal as a common predicable intention, whether the common predicable universal is prior to its particular as far as the operation of a particular nature is concerned | 14 |
| It is asked whether it is prior with respect to the intention of a particular nature | 15 |
| It is asked which of these is prior with respect to the operation of the aforementioned universal nature | 15 |
| It is asked which of these is prior with respect to the intention of a universal nature | 16 |
| It is asked concerning the comparison of the universal in relation to us, which of those is prior | 16 |
| It is asked how the universal is better known to us and to nature: it is asked which of those is better known with respect to nature | 17 |
| It is asked which of these is better known to us | 17 |
| It is asked whether the physicist has to refute non-physical positions | 18 |
| It is asked whether all things are one immobile being: whether all things are one | 19 |
| It is asked how all things are one, whether according to matter or according to form | 20 |
| It is asked whether that being is immobile | 20 |
| It is asked, given that all things were one confused thing composed of substance and accident, whether it follows that there are many | 20 |
| It is asked, if it is posited that one being exists which is an accident, whether it is necessary to posit many | 21 |
| It is asked whether it follows: "if substance exists, accident exists" | 22 |
| It is asked, if all things are one continuum, whether because of this they are many | 23 |
| It is asked whether part and whole make one | 23 |
| It is asked whether part and whole are the same according to substance or different | 24 |
| It is asked whether an accident must be predicated of a substance | 25 |
| It is asked concerning the reasoning of Melissus: that what is created has... | 25 |