Metaphysical Disquisition

...he be stripped of all prejudice. 36
6. The vanity of the preparation for that conclusion: I think, therefore I exist. 38
7. That all other things known are deduced by a necessary connection from this established principle, is false. 39
Doubt II. Concerning the non-demonstration of an incorporeal soul, from the fact that someone who is deceived, yet attentive, affirms that he finds nothing corporeal in himself; nor indeed anything that is like a spirit, wind, or other tenuous body. 41
Response. 42
Instance 1. That he who says he is nothing corporeal, but a pure Mind, is unjustly vexed if anyone dealing with him addresses him as a mind alone. 42
2. That the Soul is not proved not to be a tenuous body, if nothing else is done than to suppose that there is plainly no body in the world. And indeed various, but vain, evasions. 44
3. That it is not a demonstration if someone, to prove he has nothing pertaining to the nature of a body, brings forward nothing else than that he is deluded by an evil Genius, yet remains attentive, and can affirm no such thing. 46
Doubt III. Concerning the non-demonstration of an incorporeal Soul, from the fact that the same person affirms himself, in like manner deluded, not to perceive that he is nourished, walks, or senses; yet meanwhile perceives that he thinks. 47
Response. 48
Instance 1. Whether nothing impugned and proposed was worthy of a response. 50
2. That he does not demonstrate, but begs the question, who, intending to prove that the Soul does not grow, weaken, or become disturbed with the body, says nothing else than that the Soul uses the body as an instrument. 51
3. That Demonstrations are rightly demanded from him who boasts that he demonstrates; and that it is wrong to remit to the Sixth Meditation for proof that which is there supposed to have been proved in this one, where nonetheless it was not proved. 52

4. That he who says he has no reason why he should call the Soul a tenuous body, does not therefore demonstrate that the soul is not a tenuous body. 54
5. That it is not proved that things are distinct in reality from the fact that there are distinct concepts of thought and corporeity; and that what had been objected concerning the reasoning of brutes, and the necessity of the brain for reasoning, ought not to have been ignored. 56
Doubt IV. Concerning the unproven conclusion: I am, therefore, precisely a thinking thing, that is, a Mind, a Soul, an intellect, a reason. 57
Response. 59
Instance 1. On the use of the terms Soul and Mind; and on thought in the womb and during lethargy. 60
2. That the response concerning the unsuitability of the brain in an infant or a lethargic person for receiving the traces of things is of no account. 61
3. That again, what is supposed in the Sixth Meditation to have been performed is not performed here; and that the following conclusion is flawed: I know myself precisely only as a thinking thing; Therefore I am only a thinking thing. 62
Doubt V. Concerning the unproven distinction between the Intellect and the Imagination, as if understanding were possible without imagination. 64
Response. 66
Instance 1. That he who knows something of himself does not therefore know himself as a whole. And that he who says he recognizes nothing in himself that falls under the imagination does not therefore perceive his own nature most distinctly. 66
2. That the difficulty concerning the corporeal image, without which the mind cannot understand, was evaded. 67
3. That the difficulty was also evaded concerning the criterion by which it might be discerned when we conceive something by imagination which is not intellection, or by intellection which is not imagination. 69
Doubt VI. That a Mind must seemingly be attributed to Brutes, if the Mind is a thing that senses, imagines, etc. 71
Response. 73
Instance 1. That the difficulty concerning the reasoning of Brutes was unjustly evaded. 73