Metaphysical Disquisition

AND INSTANCES.

2. That it is not a criterion, but a begging of the question regarding the distinction between Mind and body, that the former is called a Thinking Thing, the latter an extended one: and that it is false that the whole nature of the former consists in thought, and of the latter in extension. 74
3. Again, it is far from the case that he who perceives that the mind thinks, therefore has the whole, or intimate, nature of the mind perceived. 77
4. That it has not been proved that the mind understands independently of the brain; even when it notices that it is dreaming while dreaming. 79
Doubt VII. On the example of the Wax: That when all its accidents are removed by the mind, its intimate nature is not therefore known clearly and distinctly, and indeed by the intellect without the imagination. 81
Response. 82
Instance 1. That nothing was not rightly objected from the very mention of the words. 83
2. That the primary difficulties concerning the substance of the wax remaining hidden were meanwhile concealed; and similarly the substance of the Mind,

Upon the Third Meditation, which is On God, That he exists.

Doubt I. On having a Rule, not by which it is established that what we perceive clearly and distinctly is true; but by which we may know that we perceive so clearly and distinctly that we are not deceived. 95
Response. 97
Instance 1. On the connection of the Meditations, and what contradictions follow from the Rule supposed here, while not yet having that knowledge of God which is supposed to be forthcoming. 98
2. That the primary difficulty which was objected against the Rule or its application was avoided and concealed. 100
3. That a Rule or Method is still wanting, by which, when we think we perceive something clearly and distinctly, we may be certain that all things have been so considered that nothing can

however much they are known and viewed with some accidents removed. 84
Doubt VIII. On the Nature of the mind not being declared; it is far from being proved that it is better known than the body. 86
Response. 89
Instance 1. That the primary difficulties were concealed. 89
2. That whatever we know of things is not their intimate nature; which God willed to be hidden from us, as the knowledge of it is not as necessary for us as that of accidents. 90
3. That it is a neat evasion; that as many properties of the mind are acknowledged as there are singular things that can be known by it; so that from there it may be argued that a fuller knowledge of it is had than of any other thing. 92
4. The whole Second Meditation is condensed into a Syllogism, so that the weakness of the reasoning might be more apparent; and various things are noted concerning the claim that the Mind is said to be better known than the body. 94

arise from which we may be found to have erred. 102
Doubt II. On the adventitious origin of all Ideas, even of Chimeras; even of Thing, Truth, and thought. 103
Response. 105
Instance 1. That the primary difficulties were avoided, by which it is established that ideas are nothing but adventitious; and by what artifice some ideas were taken as examples, and others passed over. 105
2. That what had been objected specifically regarding the Idea of a Thing—not formed except from observed singulars and the previously held ideas of them—was avoided: And, that he who, after he has affected to cast off all prejudices, detects some ideas in himself, cannot say they are innate. 107