An ornate rectangular woodcut headpiece. In the center is a radiant sun with a face. Flanking it are various winged putti; on the left, one rides a sea creature, and on the right, two putti interact with a large reptile or crocodile. The scene is framed with scrolling acanthus leaves and floral motifs.

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF EPICURUS

PART THREE,

WHICH IS

ETHICS,

OR

ON MORALS.

A small decorative woodcut ornament featuring a circular frame with a figure sitting and reading, surrounded by decorative scrollwork.

Page 78, verse 11.

Hitherto EPI 3 on things pertaining to life original: "τῶν βιωτικῶν". we have dealt with the Physics part of Epicurus's Philosophy. The Ethical part now remains, about which Laërtius, as he undertook at the beginning, is now about to bring forward the last of the three Epistles he chose, which summarily embrace the whole of Epicurus's Philosophy. However, he does this after he has first provided, as he prefaces, those things which please Epicurus and the Epicureans regarding the description of the Wise Man. I read in verse 12 "things to be chosen, and things to be avoided" original: "αἱρετὰ, τὰ δ’ ἐκφευκτὰ" instead of "to avoid, and things to be chosen" original: "ἐκφύγειν, τὰ δ’ αἱρετὰ", because the manuscripts also have it this way, and everywhere else this order is maintained: that things to be chosen, or embraced, are mentioned first, and things to be shunned are mentioned second; although this is not of great importance.

It should therefore rather be observed that this part of Philosophy is designated here as "concerning the things of life" original: "περὶ τῶν βιωτικῶν", concerning those things which pertain to life. This conforms to the title of those books which Epicurus inscribed "On Lives" original: "περὶ βίων", or if you prefer, "On the types of life," or "The ways of conducting life." Indeed, this part is also called the Art of Life by most, and it has long been customary to ask: "Is there any art concerning life?" original: "εἰ ἔστι τις περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη;". Truly, as mention is also made of things to be chosen and things to be shunned, it is suggested that which was said at the beginning: that this Part was also called "On things to be chosen and avoided" original: "περὶ αἱρετῶν, καὶ φευκτῶν". Books were also inscribed "On choice and avoidance" original: "περὶ αἱρέσεως, καὶ φυγῆς". Epicurus seems for this reason to have preferred Prudence even over Natural Philosophy.

Since it is the property of Prudence to choose these things and shun those, he judged Prudence to be the same as Moral Philosophy. In which sense Plutarch also teaches that, while some things exist in themselves, like the sky, the stars, the earth, and the sea; others are related to us, like good and evil, the desirable and the avoidable, the pleasant and the troublesome. Wisdom is concerned with the former, but Prudence with the latter.
Book on Moral Virtue.

It could be added here that this usual part is also designated by the Epicureans as "concerning the End" original: "περὶ τέλους", but it is better to stick to that which was common to them with others: to call it "the ethical" original: "τὸ ἠθικὸν", the Moral Part of Philosophy.
Book 6, chapter 2.

Indeed, Quintilian notes that the Roman language lacks a name to express the Greek word ethos original: "ἦθος", because to one looking at the nature of the matter, it seems to signify not so much "customs" as a certain property of character, such as a gentleness and mitigation of the emotions. It is as if ethos original: "ἦθος" and pathos original: "πάθος" are opposed in such a way that ethos is a milder emotion and pathos a more agitated emotion. Yet he himself also admits that those things are called "mores" meaning customs or character, and from that, the "ethical" original: "ἠθικὴν" was called the Moral part of Philosophy.
Aristotle's Ethics Book 1, chapter 13, etc.; Book 2, chapter 1; Plutarch's On Moral Virtue and On Educating Children.

When he says that "all habits of the mind are contained within customs," that might be true in a more general sense. But specifically, the habits of the mind that are purely speculative, and have no order toward action or especially toward appetite, are not called customs. For this reason, Aristotle also established a distinction in more than one place between habits and virtues that are "intellectual and moral" original: "διανοητικὰς, καὶ ἠθικὰς". Furthermore, Aristotle teaches that the moral genus of habits is called ethikon original: "ἠθικὸν" from the...