On the Moral Philosophy of Epicurus, Observations

He seethes, and his life is inconsistent in its entire order. A quote from Horace, Epistles 1.1.99, describing a person who lacks the stability provided by philosophy. I will pass over the fact that this same principle pleased not only the Cynics, but also Cleanthes among the Stoics more than others, as recorded in Diogenes Laertius. For although Chrysippus thought that Wisdom (in the name of virtue) could be lost, as through drunkenness or "black bile" Melancholy or severe mental illness, thought to be caused by an excess of black bile in the body., it was the opinion of Cleanthes that wisdom is incapable of being lost Original Greek: anapoblēton., on account of firm comprehensions Original Greek: dia bebaias katalēpseōs. This refers to the Stoic idea that once a truth is fully grasped by the mind, it becomes an unshakeable part of the soul.. That is to say, Wisdom must be judged by a stable habit and by acts brought forth by deliberate reason, rather than those which burst out unnaturally from distorted visions, as in those cases mentioned by Chrysippus.

Seneca, Letter 50.

Seneca, standing with Cleanthes on this point, writes: We ought to approach the correction of ourselves with a greater spirit because the possession of a good once handed over is perpetual. Virtue is not unlearned; for the opposing evils stick to what is foreign to them. Therefore they can be expelled and driven out; those things which come into their own place sit faithfully. Virtue is according to nature; vices are hostile and harmful. But just as virtues, once received, cannot leave, etc.

V. 24. To invent nothing willingly. Original Greek: Mēden plattein hekonta. This refers to the philosopher's duty to avoid creating fictions or myths. I add to these words "to be joined more to truth," instead of "to be joined more to passions." Indeed, the preceding phrase—"to invent nothing"—suggests we are dealing here with truth as opposed to fiction, rather than with the passions. Furthermore, what follows—"in being an obstacle to wisdom"—argues that the discussion is about avoiding fictions. In this way, an obstacle to Wisdom is not placed, but removed. If it were about undergoing passions to which one might cling, an obstacle would be placed rather than removed. Certainly, Epicurus also contends that the Wise Man ought to be as free from passions as possible, as will be clear from what follows. He was a man to whom naked and open truth was so dear that he could not even approve of, but rather criticized, what Cicero

In the Brutus.

writes: That irony by which Socrates, in the works of Plato, raises Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Gorgias, and the others to the heavens with praises, while he feigns that he himself is ignorant of all things and unrefined. Thus, the same could be said of Epicurus as was later said of Quintilius Varus, one of his followers:

Horace, Odes Book 1, 24.

Uncorrupted faith, and naked truth;
When will they find any peer?

Furthermore, that this saying should be read in this sense can be understood from a passage in Ma-

crobius. In this work, Colotes, a student of Epicurus, criticized Plato because of the famous story he invented about Er the Armenian. This Er had died in battle, and when the bodies were picked up ten days later, already quite decayed, he was found uncorrupted. He was carried home to be buried, and on the twelfth day after his death, while he was being placed on the funeral pyre

Various sayings about the Wise Man.

he came back to life. Having returned to the living, he recounted in a long speech what he had seen and observed in the underworld. These are the words of Colotes: A philosopher should not have invented a myth; for no kind of fiction is suitable for professors of truth. Why, he asks, if you wished to teach us a notion of heavenly things or the condition of souls, was this not handled with a simple and absolute statement? Instead, a persona was sought, and a novel case was devised, and a stage was constructed for an invented fiction, which polluted the very gate of searching for truth with a lie. I note only that what is said—"the gate of truth is polluted by fiction"—means an obstacle is made at the very threshold. It prevents one from reaching the knowledge of truth, which is wisdom, if a story is presented. For if what Er, for example, is said to have narrated about the Underworld was true in itself, there is a suspicion that it is false insofar as he neither saw nor narrated what is attributed to him. But if it was false in itself, there is a suspicion that it might be true insofar as the person telling it is considered wise. The result is that the student of Wisdom, listening to the Wise Man, is in a dilemma: he may embrace the true for the false, or the false for the true. In either way, he wanders from the truth he seeks. A related obstacle comes from the coverings of myths; what lies hidden under them cannot be discerned except by guessing. Thus, in place of genuine doctrine, it becomes nothing but an opportunity for soothsaying.

Metaphysics, Book 3, chapter 4.

Aristotle points this out excellently. When speaking of the principles of things, he complains that the ancient poets and all the theologians, by calling things by the names of the Gods, paid attention to what they themselves thought, but meanwhile looked down on us or cared little in what sense we would receive what they had said. The same can be said of those who cover what they teach in symbols, riddles, and enigmas. They make a playful thing out of a serious matter. With the same mouth by which they wish to seem to declare the truth, they pour out darkness by which it is obscured:

Book 1.

Heraclitus enters, the leader who first began the battle,
Famous for his obscure tongue, more among the empty-headed
Than among the serious Greeks who seek the truth.
For the foolish admire and love all things more
Which they see hidden under inverted words;
And they establish as true things those which can pleasantly touch
The ears, and which are disguised with a charming sound.

This is a quote from Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, Book 1, lines 638–644, criticizing the philosopher Heraclitus for his notoriously difficult and "dark" writing style. This is the objection raised by Lucretius. I add that even if nothing else were to be condemned, the loss of time spent in guessing certainly cannot be approved. That time could and should be spent on attempting further progress. There is a common excuse for these things, which Simplicius offers when he asks why Aristotle followed not myths or symbols, but obscurity Original Greek: asapheian. in his speaking.

Prologue to the Categories.

Namely, that the ancients did not want their Wisdom to be degraded down even to the shoemakers. This means they did not want it to be open to the common people, lest it be profaned once it was understood.

A 3