In Book 10 of Diogenes Laertius,

Various sayings concerning the Wise Man. [The previous page discussed how wisdom] might be shared. But to pass over that, it does not seem that wisdom should be begrudged to the whole of the human race. For wisdom is of such a nature that if its true character were known, it could not fail to kindle a fire and draw all people toward honesty, or at least the greatest part of them, even among the common folk. Why, I ask, was it necessary to shut out the common people and set up a cross for those who strive for wisdom and truth with the most burning zeal? The common people either lack the leisure to attend to the investigation of nature, or it is enough for them to listen to those who have attended to it. Why should things be presented in such a way to those who have leisure and a heart to know the truth that they must labor more to understand the mind of the speaker than to learn the facts themselves? But setting these things aside, I say only that Epicurus was as much an enemy of all obscurity as he was of fables. He never cared for anything more than to say whatever he wished as clearly as possible. Therefore, it may seem strange why his followers imitated him in this, as is understood from two or three citations, Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, Book 5. yet Clement of Alexandria writes that the Epicureans assert: original: "τινὰ νὴ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἀπόῤῥητα εἶναι, καὶ μὴ πᾶσιν ἐπιτρέπειν ἐντυγχάνειν τοῖς οἷς γράμμασιν" "certain things among them were secret, and they did not allow everyone to read those writings." This is unless perhaps one thinks this refers to Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, Book 3. what Cicero says: that Epicurus established "Gods" in word, but "removed them in reality," and that the former view was held in his common books, while the latter was in his secret ones. But Cicero, who On the Nature of the Gods, Book 1; On Moral Ends, Book 1. is not otherwise accustomed to spare Epicurus, never interpreted him in such a way. Indeed, as we have reported elsewhere, Cicero said of Epicurus: "they think ill of a man who is not at all crafty." And: "Epicurus does not wish to speak anything but plainly and openly, if he can." Truly, if Epicurus or his followers had felt the need to keep anything hidden, it would have been that opinion concerning Providence and immortality. Yet they published these views so widely, as is manifest from those things we have disputed against them.

§. 27. Neither indeed from every habit of body. What follows immediately—nor in every nation—Aldobrandinus reads as nor in every custom. However, the common reading should be retained, which Stromata, Book 1. Clement of Alexandria supports. He writes that Epicurus thought original: "μόνους φιλοσοφῆσαι Ἕλληνας δύνασθαι" "only Greeks were able to philosophize." Epicurus surely did not mean this as an absolute statement. He himself admitted friends from as far as Egypt to his philosophy. He knew his contemporaries Aristippus of Cyrene and Diogenes of Sinope, who were philosophers at Athens. In the then recent expedition of Alexander, he could not have been ignorant of the Sages found in India. Rather, he intended to suggest that the happiness of a man born

On page 78. among Barbarians In this context, "Barbarians" refers to any non-Greek speaking peoples. is not equal to one born in Greece itself. To one born in Greece, all necessary aids for philosophizing were open; to one born among Barbarians, none were available. Thus it resulted that many philosophized in Greece, while among Barbarians, none or very few did so. Lactantius certainly confirms this when he acknowledges no one from the Barbarians who philosophized except for one, Anacharsis the Scythian. Lactantius says Book 3, chapter 14. that Anacharsis "would not have even dreamed of philosophy unless he had first learned the language and the literature of the Greeks." Therefore, Epicurus seems to have looked only to the fact that Thales, as recorded in Laertius, Book 1. gave thanks to Fortune not only that he was a human and not a beast, or a man and not a woman, but also original: "ὅτι Ἕλλην, καὶ οὐ βάρβαρος" "that he was born a Greek and not a Barbarian." Furthermore, Epicurus judged that not every bodily habit was fit for attaining wisdom. This is understood especially regarding that imbalance or injury of the brain which results in dullness or incurable madness. I say nothing of injured organs of sight and hearing, or of an appetite unbridled in its passions, or of ferocity and cruelty. Such things lead one so far from wisdom that, since Mercury was considered the God of Wisdom, this gave rise to the proverb: A Mercury is not made from every piece of wood. A Latin adage, "Non ex omni ligno Mercurius," meaning that not everyone has the natural talent or "material" to become a scholar or a wise person. This is surely why Plato also Republic, Book 6. requires a nature that is teachable, possessing a good memory, burning for the truth, not illiberal, not moody, not proud, not immodest, not faint-hearted, and not unjust. Lactantius objects that Epicurus invites even the unrefined to the study of wisdom. Lactantius asks: "How could they understand those things said about the principles of things, which are so perplexed and involved that even polished men can scarcely grasp them?" But it is clear that those whom he calls "unrefined" are those who lack culture, but not natural talent. They possess such docility that they offer an ear willing to be cultivated. As for the rest, Epicurus distinguishes three classes or orders of those who can aspire to wisdom. The matter should be told in the words of Seneca: Letter 52. "Epicurus says that some have come forth to the truth without any help; they made a way for themselves. These he praises most, who had the impulse from within themselves, and who brought themselves forward." (This type is rare, and Lucretius openly contends that Epicurus himself was of this kind.) Books 1, 3, etc. "Others," Seneca continues, "require the work of another; they will not go if no one goes before them, but they follow well. Among these he says was Metrodorus. This is also an excellent nature, but of the second rank." And a little later: "Besides these, you will find another type of men, not to be despised, who can be driven and compelled toward the right. These need not only a leader but an assistant and, so to speak, a compeller. This is the third type. If you seek an example, Epicurus says Hermachus was such a man. Therefore, he congratulates the one more, but respects the other more. For although both reached the same end, the praise is greater for having achieved the same in a more difficult [circumstance]..."