Observations on the Moral Philosophy of Epicurus

On page 79. They have the name of friends, but they do not have the reality, who fail to show themselves as friends when times are difficult. Regarding his statement that only the Wise Man is a friend because of his consistency, appearing the same at all times, this can be confirmed from Ibid. what Cicero wrote. Cicero shows there is a great scarcity of that kind of friend who is not proven guilty of either lightness or weakness. Such people either despise their friends in good times or abandon them in bad times.

He, therefore, who proves himself serious, constant, and stable in friendship in both circumstances, we must judge this man to belong to a most rare and almost divine class of humans.

But because this saying of Epicurus is entirely identical to one of the Stoic Paradoxes, it is better to hear Letter 81. what Seneca proposes in favor of Epicurus. Seneca says: And so we deny that anyone knows how to return gratitude except the Wise Man; no more than anyone knows how to give a benefit except the Wise Man. This is because the Wise Man takes more joy in giving than the other does in receiving. Someone might count this among those things which seem to be said unexpectedly to everyone (the Greeks call these paradoxa, meaning "contrary to common opinion"). Such a person might ask: Does no one then know how to return gratitude except the Wise Man? Does no one else know how to pay back what he owes his creditor, or how to pay the seller the price when he buys something? But lest we become objects of hatred, know that Epicurus says the same thing. Metrodorus certainly says: Only the Wise Man knows how to return gratitude. Seneca continues as if to confirm the saying: Then he marvels at the same thing when we say, Only the Wise Man knows how to love; only the Wise Man is a friend. And yet, returning gratitude is a part of both love and friendship. Indeed, this is more common and applies to more people than true friendship does. Then he marvels at what we say, that there is no faith except in the Wise Man, as if he does not say the same thing himself. Does it seem to you that a man has faith if he does not know how to return gratitude? Therefore, let them stop defaming us as if we were boasting of incredible things. Let them know that true honors exist with the Wise Man, while among the common people there are only shadows and images of honorable things. No one knows how to return gratitude except the Wise Man. The fool also returns it however he knows and as best he can. He lacks the knowledge rather than the will. Willingness cannot be learned. The Wise Man will compare all things among themselves. His work may be greater or smaller (though it remains the same) depending on time, place, and cause. For often, riches poured into a house could not do what a thousand denarii given at the right moment could. So too he had said not long before regarding the same sentiment: Not everyone knows how to owe a benefit gratefully. Even an ignorant person, an unrefined one, or one of the crowd can return a benefit and compensate for it (especially while he is still close to the time of receiving it), but he is ignorant of how much he owes. To the Wise Man alone is it known at what price each thing should be valued. For that fool of whom I spoke just now, even if he has good will, returns it either less than he should, or at the wrong time, or in a place where he should not. He pours out and throws away that which should be returned. Since nothing needs to be added here, I only note what Seneca inserted in passing, that the Wise Man rejoices more in the giving than the other in the receiving. This is a saying which Plutarch attributes to Epicurus

not once, but several times. It is the voice that says: To do good is more pleasant than to receive it. original: Τὸ εῦ ποιεῖν ἥδιον ἐστὶν τοῦ πάσχειν And again: Various sayings concerning the Wise Man. 2. Against Colotes. Book on the difference with Princes. Chapter 10. To do good is not only more beautiful, but also more pleasant than to receive it; for nothing is so productive of joy as gratitude. original: τῷ εὖ ποιεῖν οὐ μόνον κάλλιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἥδιον εἶναι: χαρᾶς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὕτως γόνιμον ἐστὶν, ὡς χάρις. It is well known how much this conforms to that sacred sentiment: It is more blessed to give than to receive. original: Μακάριόν ἐστι διδόναι μᾶλλον, ἢ λαμβάνειν. This is a quote from the Book of Acts 20:35, often attributed to Jesus. Truly, the matter does not need further elaboration.

The Wise Man will have nothing to do with that woman whom the laws forbid.

Section 4. He will not have sexual relations with a woman. original: Γυναικὶ τε οὐ μιγήσεσθαι. There have been those who, although this saying is otherwise praiseworthy, have interpreted it maliciously. Origen seems to have agreed with them when writing against Celsus. He says: The philosophers who follow Zeno of Citium avoid adultery; so do those who are pleased with Epicurus as a teacher (and even some from the unlettered common folk). But see how varied their motives are in fleeing from adultery. The Stoics think it is a sin against nature and human society if someone violates a woman legally joined to another and corrupts his family. The Epicureans, however, do not abstain for this reason. They direct all their actions toward one goal: Pleasure. A person cheats himself of many pleasures when he succumbs to this one. Sometimes he falls into prison, exile, or death. The act itself is not without danger while he observes the husband leaving the house and watches those who favor the husband. Therefore, suppose he could deceive the husband, his household, and the others from whom he fears disgrace. As far as pleasure is concerned, even an Epicurean would become an adulterer. Thus says Origen. Furthermore, since a saying of this kind claims a reverence for the laws, because of which the Wise Man would avoid not only adultery, but also debauchery, incest, and all other intercourse forbidden by law: It clearly appears that the conclusion drawn from it is dragged out only to stir up hatred. And indeed, the Wise Man, while he keeps the laws and does not violate the rights of society, avoids troubles and dangers he would otherwise encounter. It is not unseemly for him to care for his own safety while he wishes the laws to remain intact. But if the laws did not prohibit it, would he commit adultery? You might not know whether that question is asked more spitefully or more thoughtlessly. For if you take away the laws, the sexual unions of humans will be as indiscriminate as those of wild beasts. When women were held in common (which Plato indeed wanted), this woman would not be yours rather than another's. There would be no wife, no marriage, the violation of which would be adultery or have any punishment attached to it. But there is no necessity to pursue these points.

Volume 2. B