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Book 1 and 2.
Book 15, chapter 2.
...whether they drank water everywhere or were content with a small measure of wine, he wished it to be allowed for them to occasionally indulge their natural inclination just a little. This was for the exact same purpose as Plato, who, in his books on laws, as Aulus Gellius A second-century Roman author known for his "Attic Nights," a collection of notes on grammar, philosophy, and history. observes: did not praise that most shameful drunkenness which usually weakens and diminishes the minds of men, but he did not disapprove of this somewhat more generous and pleasant invitation to wine, which would take place under certain sober judges and masters of the banquets. For he thought, Gellius continues, that minds are refreshed and renewed for the restoration of the duties of sobriety by moderate and honorable relaxations during drinking; and that they are gradually rendered more cheerful and made more fit to resume their intentions. And that this was indeed the mind of Epicurus will be understood more fully from what is to be said below concerning the advantages of sobriety. From these things it will also become manifest that he could not have approved of that Stoic distinction, by which they decreed
Book 7.
in Laertius: That the Wise Man will be drenched in wine, but will not be drunk, The Stoics argued that a Wise Man might drink heavily, but his reason would remain unclouded, unlike a common drunkard. that is, he would do the same as those who are drunk, but not from intention, and with his mind nonetheless persisting in its purpose. This is attacked from another side not only by Philo Philo of Alexandria, a Jewish philosopher who sought to harmonize Greek philosophy with Jewish scripture. while he discusses the question
Book on the planting of Noah.
whether the wise man gets drunk, which he says was studied diligently by most philosophers; but
Letter 83.
also by Seneca himself: For if, he says, you argue that the Wise Man is intoxicated by much wine and retains his right course even if he is tipsy, you might as well conclude that he will not die from drinking poison, nor sleep after taking opium, nor vomit up whatever sticks in his guts after taking hellebore. But if his feet stumble and his tongue is not steady, why should you think him to be partly sober and partly drunk? You might say Lucretius A Roman poet and Epicurean philosopher, author of "On the Nature of Things." looked toward the same point when he touched upon the foulness and inconveniences of drunkenness thus:
Book 3.
When the force of wine has penetrated,
And its sharp heat has spread abroad into the veins;
A heaviness of the limbs follows: the legs
Are hindered for the staggering man: the tongue slows; the mind is soaked;
The eyes swim; shouting, sobbing, and quarrels break out, etc.
Here I connect two related sayings; and to the interpretation I add, unless something intervenes, relying on the authority of Seneca, from whom a restoration into the text could perhaps also have been introduced. For his words are: *Two greatest sects disagree in this matter, the Epicureans and the Stoics; but each sends one toward leisure by a different path.
On the leisure of the wise, chapter 30.
Epicurus says: The Wise Man will not enter public life, unless something should hinder him; the other Stoic seeks leisure from a purpose, the former Epicurean seeks it from a cause.* This sort of exception is meanwhile in the place of a response to what can be objected: concerning the neglect of the Fatherland or public utility. Since if a time should intervene in which the Fatherland requires the counsel and help of the Wise Man, he would be the one to set his own leisure
behind its safety. For this reason, those things also collapse
On page 79.
In Arrian, Book 3, chapter 7.
On Stoic contradictions.
which Epictetus A prominent Stoic philosopher who was born a slave. exaggerates in this place, especially since Plutarch objects to the leaders of that same sect, Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, that while they exhorted the Wise Man to take up public life, they themselves followed the tranquility praised by Epicurus.
Speech for Sestius.
Those things also collapse which Cicero holds, when he records that, according to the decrees of Epicurus: Wise men do all things for their own sake; a sane man ought not to take up public life; nothing is more excellent than a life of leisure, full and crowded with pleasures; he notes it in such a way as if the sense were that they are prophetic and insane, who say that one must serve dignity; consult for the Republic; that the logic of duty, not of advantage, must be followed in all life; that dangers must be undergone for the fatherland, wounds received, and death sought. It points to the same thing when writing to Trebatius: What will happen, he says, to the people of Ulubrae, if you decide (namely since he was an Epicurean) that one ought not to engage in politics? Furthermore, another exception could be applied here, which is found in
On tranquility of the mind.
Plutarch, and is also reported by Stobaeus.
Sermon 2. 9.
For the opinion of Epicurus is read to have been original: "ὅτι δεῖν ἡσυχάζειν, ἀλλὰ τῇ φύσει χρηστῶς πολιτευομένους, καὶ πράσσοντας τὰ κοινὰ τοὺς φιλοτίμους, καὶ φιλοδόξους, ὡς μᾶλλον ὑπ’ ἀπραγμοσύνης ταράττεσθαι, καὶ κακῶς πεφυκότας, ἂν ὧν ὀρέγονται, μὴ τυγχάνωσιν." that it is necessary to remain quiet, but those who are ambitious and glory-seeking by nature should engage in politics and manage public affairs, as they would be more disturbed by inactivity and ill-disposed if they do not obtain what they desire.
In On Friendship.
This indeed coheres with what Theodorus Prodromus A twelfth-century Byzantine writer. says Epicurus established, original: "ἀγαθὸν ἑκάστῳ τὴν ἡδονήν" pleasure is the good for each individual. Whether, however, Epicurus for that reason calls to public life those who cannot remain quiet rather than those who can rule excellently, as that author indeed objects, is not difficult to recognize. Since Epicurus wanted nothing else than that philosophical leisure otium is to be preferred to a busy life negotium, all other things being equal. But, if anyone feels himself urged as if by a sting of glory, and is otherwise active and suitable for managing public affairs, and moreover either the condition of birth, or chance and opportunity opens an easy door to the administration of public matters; there is a reason why he should prefer an active life. Insofar as it is permitted to observe, it is no less laborious for those born for business to live in leisure than for those born for leisure to live in business. Furthermore, if anyone is either prepared for leisure by his own nature, or has repressed ambition and vanity by the force of reason, or having experienced what that matter is, has emerged as if from storms; Epicurus rightly thinks that leisure is far more excellent for him; nor is it fitting that he should exchange it for an active life, unless perhaps something intervenes on the part of the Republic that demands his industry.
And indeed it is known to no one how many...