Observations on the Tenth Book of Diogenes Laertius

On the Moral Philosophy of Epicurus, Commentary.

Page 17

Regarding page 80.

...if that one thing which remains and overflows from pain should fall away. For, while no one should hope or desire to suffer nothing at all, a person should instead observe this limit: one that imitates neither impiety nor insanity. It should keep us in a state of mind that is pious and not agitated. Let tears flow, but let them also cease; let groans be drawn from the deep chest, but let them also come to an end.

Book 7, chapter 19. Book 12, chapter 5.

"So rule your mind," etc. You might believe that an example of such monstrosity or savagery—or as Pliny calls it, a "hard rigor and grimness," stubborn and inflexible—was expressed in that Stoic whom Aulus Gellius wrote that he visited, along with the philosopher Taurus and others, while the man was suffering. We saw, he says, the man sinking under pains and tortures, which the Greeks call colic original: "κωλῶν", and at the same time afflicted by a swift fever. Suppressed groans broke out from him, and gasps and breaths escaped his chest, indicating not so much the pain itself as a struggle against the pain. And later: You have seen, Taurus said, a sight that is certainly not pleasant, but nonetheless useful to know: a philosopher and pain meeting and fighting. That force and nature of the disease did its part, causing the distraction and torture of the limbs; but on the other hand, reason and the nature of the mind did what was equally its own part. It endured, restrained, and coerced within itself the violence of unbridled pain. He uttered no wails, no lamentations, nor even any unseemly words; yet there were certain signs, as you saw, of virtue and the body fighting for possession of the man. Truly, if Epicurus had been present, he would have said it was better to let those groans, breaths, and gasps flow out freely, as if of their own accord, rather than to suppress them out of an ambitious desire to prove one's constancy, only for them to eventually break out like a torrent with even greater harm.

Since Epicurus in this passage rejects the Stoic apathy original: "ἀπάθειαν," meaning a total lack of passion or feeling, it is clear that he shares the views of Pythagoras (or at least the Pythagoreans found in Stobaeus), as well as Plato, Aristotle, and others who approved of moderation of the passions original: "μετριοπάθειαν," the practice of experiencing emotions in a balanced way. However, lest the Stoics be unfairly judged, they seem to have excluded from their paradox those bodily sufferings that do not depend on the will at all, such as the torture and pain of disease. This can be gathered from what Taurus later discussed in the writings of Aulus Gellius. They instead focused on the passions that exist within the soul itself, such as joy, grief, hope, fear, desire, and anger. Indeed, they did not deny that the first movements of these passions arise within us; but according to Seneca and Epictetus, these are involuntary and are not properly called "passions" until they become mental assents original: "συγκαταθέσεις," meaning the mind's agreement or approval of an impulse. That is, they arise from judgment, opinion, and choice. On this basis, the disagreement between the Stoics and the other philosophers was that the Stoics

Various maxims on the Wise Man. Academic Questions, Book 1, Section 4.

wanted the passions to be entirely cut away and abolished, while the others wanted them to be tempered or reduced to a middle ground. Note what Cicero says:

Since the ancients did not remove mental disturbance from man, and said that by nature one feels pain, desire, fear, and is carried away by joy; Zeno the founder of Stoicism wanted the wise man to be free from all these as if they were diseases.

He continues:

And since the ancients said these disturbances were natural and lacked reason, placing Desire in one part of the soul and Reason in another, Zeno did not agree with them either. He thought that disturbances were voluntary, taken up by the judgment of opinion, and that the mother of all disturbances was a certain immoderate lack of self-control.

From this passage, we can understand that the Stoics believed passions could be entirely cut away because they were located in the ruling part of the soul original: "τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ," the rational, governing part of the mind and thus depended on the choice of reason. They were nothing other than judgments and opinions, as we heard them defined earlier. The other philosophers, however, considered that they could not be totally removed because they were in the irrational part of the soul. They were uncomposed movements that Reason could rule, but perhaps not entirely abolish or prevent from existing at all.

On Moral Virtue.

Plutarch discusses this at length, showing that there are in truth two parts of our soul, and that the passions have their seat in a different place than the Rational part. He argues it is neither possible nor in our interest for the passions to be completely destroyed. I should also mention that Plutarch attributes to Epicurus the view that the "ruling part" of the soul is impassible original: "ἀπαθές," meaning unaffected by external feelings.

Opinions of the Philosophers, Book 1, Chapter 23. Tusculan Disputations, Book 3.

Finally, it is worth citing what Crantor says in Cicero:

I do not agree at all with those who greatly praise that "indolence," I know not what, which neither can nor should exist. I do not wish to be sick, he says, but if I am, let feeling be present, whether something is cut or torn from the body. For that state of feeling no pain comes only at a great price: savagery in the soul and numbness in the body.

In this passage, you see the same "apathy" or savagery noted that Epicurus objected to.

Book 19, chapter 12.

To the same effect, let me add what Herodes Atticus argued against Stoic apathy in Aulus Gellius. He had been challenged by a certain Stoic for bearing the death of a boy he loved in a way that was supposedly unwise and unmanly. In that dissertation, says Gellius, the sentiment is this: No man who feels and thinks according to nature can be entirely free and void of those affections of the soul called passions original: "πάθη", such as grief, desire, fear, anger, and pleasure, or feel no pain at all. And even if he could resist them, it would not be for the better, since the mind would grow faint and sluggish, deprived of the support of certain affections as if from its necessary power. For he said those feelings and movements of the soul, which become vices when they are immoderate, are woven and folded into certain vigors and alacrities of the mind. Therefore, if we ignorantly tear all of them away, there is a danger that we might also lose the good and useful natural qualities of the mind that are attached to them. They must be moderated...