On Book 10 of Diogenes Laertius

Various sayings about the Wise Man. He believed, therefore, that the passions must be purified skillfully and with consideration. He thought that only those things which are foreign, seem contrary to nature, and are born with destructive effects should be removed. This was to prevent what happened in the story of the foolish Thracian, who was unskilled in managing the field he had bought. He then tells the story, which is well known, but it is better to include what Lactantius says as he takes up the discussion.

Book 6, chapter 15. After Lactantius calls the Stoics "madmen" because they want to castrate a person of the things implanted by nature, he compares this to wanting to take away fear from deer, venom from snakes, anger from wild beasts, or tameness from cattle. He then adds: But these Wise men do not understand that when they take away vices from a human, they also take away the virtue for which they make a place. For, if virtue consists of restraining and repressing one's own impulse of anger (which they cannot deny), then whoever lacks anger also lacks virtue. If virtue consists of restraining the lust of the body, then he who does not have the lust to temper must necessarily lack virtue. If virtue consists of curbing the desire for what belongs to another, then certainly he who lacks the thing that virtue is used to restrain can have no virtue. Therefore, where there are no vices, there is no place for virtue; just as there is no victory where there is no adversary. Thus it happens that good cannot exist without evil in this life.

Therefore, emotion is like a natural fertility of the mind. Just as a field that is naturally fertile overflows with thorns, so an uncultivated mind is covered with vices that grow strong of their own accord, like briers. But when the true cultivator arrives, the vices immediately give way and the fruits of virtue spring up. I pass over how he later shows excellently that those same Stoics admitted these emotions under other names. For example, they want to substitute will for desire, joy for gladness, and caution for fear. I also pass over what Seneca gathers on the opposite side, and I only note

Letter 85.

Book 1, against the Pelagians. City of God, 5. that the holy Fathers, and specifically the Blessed Jerome, declare how the authority of all Holy Scripture agrees not with the opinion of the Stoics, but with that of the Peripatetics. Some others, like the Blessed Augustine, do not look so much at the moderation of emotions as at the circumstances: Indeed, in our discipline, the question is not whether a pious mind gets angry, but why it gets angry; not whether it is sad, but from what it is sad; not whether it fears, but what it fears, and so on. But enough on these things now, as more must be said on this subject later.

To add something now regarding the latter part of the Saying, which concerns being called to court: Epicurus seems to have held this only so that no one would turn it into a disgrace for the Wise Man, unless he lived in such a way that he avoided all envy, slander, and even every accusation and condemnation. For it is in the Wise Man's power to live well and virtuously, but it is not in his power to avoid experiencing the malice and injustice of others toward him. Nor can he prevent himself from being called to court, contrary to what is right and fair, and being held to plead his cause before judges who may even be unjust. The memory of Socrates, condemned to death, was still fresh; and even fresher was the memory of Aristotle, who was forced to flee for this very reason, so that the

Athenians would not sin against philosophy a second time.

On page 80.

Tusculan Disputations, 5. Although there is no need to weave together a list of examples, it is widely known what Cicero says: This happens in every nation; that is, the common people generally hate every excellence of virtue. And it is true that men are commonly disposed to hate the virtue they see in front of them, yet seek it out once it is removed from their sight. They may later condemn the judges themselves and punish the accusers with disgrace. However the oppressed Wise Man may foresee this future, his chief consolation is that, relying on a serene and safe conscience and prepared for any event of fortune however unjust, he is a "bronze wall" to himself, and he carries himself with courage and lack of disturbance in trials.

original: "γ. 7. Και συγγραμματα καταλειψειν" "And he will leave behind writings." This first part is followed by a second part with an adversative particle: original: "η πανηγυριειν δε" "but he will not perform panegyrics." Therefore, I interpret this to mean the wise man will not write panegyric orations. I add that he will not recite them in a solemn procession either, because the recitation of speeches is consistent with the writing of them. Pollux especially defines the word original: "το πανηγυριειν" "to celebrate a festival" as original: "το πανηγυρικος λογος εξενεγκειν" "to deliver a panegyric speech,"

In the Onomasticon. and original: "και πανδημους λογους ειπειν" "to speak public orations." Certainly this was consistent not only with the previously mentioned Saying, original: "ο ψηφισων καλως" "one who will vote well," since no style of speaking ought to be more elegant than the panegyric; but also with the very character of Epicurus. This is according to what is reported elsewhere by Seneca: I never wanted to please the people;

Letter 29. for the things I know, the people do not approve; and what the people approve (add also the things they are accustomed to applaud in panegyric orations), I do not know. And I should not fail to mention what Seneca also says when speaking of Epicurus: This man, he said, was unknown in Athens itself, near which he had hidden away.

Letter 79. Many years after surviving his friend Metrodorus, Epicurus wrote in a certain letter, after he had sung of his friendship with Metrodorus in grateful remembrance, and added this at the last: It did nothing to harm him or Metrodorus among such great goods that famous Greece had not only kept them unknown, but almost unheard of. Regarding the matter itself: while it may be praiseworthy for a Wise Man to write books in which (as we cited from Seneca not long ago) he hands down things that can help posterity, how could he deliver panegyrics or popular orations without being justly judged to fit the description that some of the Holy Fathers object to in philosophers? They define

Tertullian, On the Soul, chapter 1. Jerome, Letter to Julian. Tusculan Disputations, 2. a philosopher as an animal of glory and a cheap slave of popular favor. Cicero certainly put it excellently: Philosophy, he says, is content with few judges, intentionally fleeing the multitude; to the crowd itself it is both suspected and hated. So, if anyone wishes to disparage philosophy as a whole, he can do so with the support of the people.