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Doubt 7. Regarding the principal demonstration for the existence of God from the preceding materials: by whose imitation it might be constructed that infinite worlds truly exist, of which the ancient philosophers held the idea. 335
Response. 336
Counter-argument. original: "Instantia." A formal rebuttal in a scholastic debate. in the same place original: "ibid."
Article 1. That principal demonstration is proposed in a syllogistic form: and its weakness is shown first in general, and in various ways. in the same place.
2. It is then shown specifically, and in various ways, in the major proposition of the preliminary syllogism. 337
3. And similarly in the minor proposition, or the assumption. 338
4. And again in the sub-assumption: where also concerning the logical consequence for the existence of infinite worlds. 339
5. It is false that the idea we have of an infinite Being truly represents not a part, but the whole infinite. And how the idea which God has of himself differs from that which man has of God. 340
Doubt 8. Regarding the subsidiary demonstration, from the fact that he who perceives something to be lacking in himself ought to infer that a Being is given who is infinitely more perfect. 341
Response. 342
Counter-argument. in the same place.
Article 1. That the difficulty was concealed concerning that logical consequence: if one thing is more perfect than another, therefore that thing is infinite. in the same place.
2. That paralogisms logical fallacies are always committed by which, from the actual existence of an idea, the actual existence of the thing is gathered: from the finiteness of knowledge, which can still grow, the infinity of the thing known: from the fact that something is in an idea, the existence of that thing as a cause. 343
Doubt 9. Regarding another subsidiary demonstration, from the fact that something could not be made, or exist, if an infinite Being did not exist: and that the parts of time are independent of each other. 344
Response. 345
Counter-argument. in the same place.
Article 1. That it was not demonstrated in the preceding arguments that God is the creator: just as it was not demonstrated that God is the cause of things in the way the Sun is the cause of light. in the same place.
Gassendi's other Philosophical works.
2. That the fallacy remains from the assumed condition of Time, or a nature other than what it is. 346
3. That the demonstration deduced from the independence of the parts of time from each other fails in various ways. 347
4. That here it is not a matter of the truth of the thing itself, but of the force of the reasoning, against which the things that had been especially objected were either left unresolved or untouched. 349
5. That what had been objected regarding an infinite progress in essentially and accidentally subordinated causes was wrongly distorted. in the same place.
6. That it does not follow from the fact that some perfection is expanded in the mind that this expanded perfection truly exists. 350
Doubt 10. Regarding the manner of the impression of the idea of God on the mind, like a mark impressed by a craftsman, whose likeness the mind bears. in the same place.
Response. 351
Counter-argument. in the same place.
Article 1. Those things concluded at the end of the Third Meditation are shown in a syllogistic form, so that their strength may be visible at a single glance. in the same place.
2. It is false that nothing can be added to, or taken away from, the ideas we have of things. 352
3. It is false that nothing can be added to the idea we once have of God. In what sense the essences of things are indivisible, even the divine essence: and regarding the divine attributes. 353
4. It is explained in various ways how the idea once held of God may be expanded. 354
5. That the difficulty was gracefully evaded: as if it concerned an idea that was not a likeness of the craftsman, but a mark of his skill. 355
6. That in an image there must be, if not every kind of likeness, at least some likeness with that of which it is the image. 356
7. That the difficulty was declined under the pretext of an inappropriate comparison to a triangle, regarding those who either have no idea of God or do not have the same idea. 357
A decorative drop cap initial D marks the beginning of the text section.
Doubt 1. Regarding the faculty of judging created by God, which is not immune to error: and after that was rejected, from the physical consideration of final causes. 358