Complete Works, Volume Three

of Sections, Parts, and Books

3. That the mind is conceived as a substance, or a thing existing by itself; yet it is not concluded that it is therefore a substance, or a thing existing by itself. 393
4. A demonstration proposed in a confused manner is reduced into a Syllogistic form. original: "Syllogisticam." A formal logical argument consisting of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. in the same place. original: "ibid."
5. A flawed method of demonstrating from the fact that someone says they experience it in themselves. That a Paralogism original: "Paralogismum." A piece of illogical or fallacious reasoning. is repeated here, which was emphasized in Meditation 11, regarding the separability of things based on the separability of concepts. 394
6. From responses to others, it can be gathered what might have been answered regarding the objection about two properties of a Triangle, which can indeed be conceived, but cannot exist separately. 395
7. That the question is poorly framed. The question is not whether two complete substances are separable; but whether two things understood separately are two complete substances. ibid.
8. Recourse is made in vain to the distinction between adequate and inadequate knowledge, since no knowledge is adequate, nor can it be known to be adequate. 396
9. That the question concerns special thought and extension; and it has not yet been proven that it is incompatible for an extended, bodily thing to think. 397
10. Although there can be extension without thought, and thought without extension, it has not yet been proven that both cannot exist together in the same thin body, such as the soul might be; and this is shown even from the counter-examples. 398
11. From the proposed precision of concepts, it is inferred that the mind is bodily, or rather that it is constructed as inseparable rather than separable. ibid.

Doubt 4. Regarding the appearance of a bodily thing, which does not seem able to be received in an incorporeal mind; and regarding the mind, which, if it coexists with the body or an extended thing, does not seem able to be unextended. 399
Response. 401
Counter-argument. original: "Instantia." A formal rebuttal in a scholastic debate. ibid.
Article 1. A clever evasion. That an appearance original: "speciem." In this context, a mental image or representation of an object. or image is also required for understanding; and there is no image of an extended thing without extension. ibid.
2. That the comparison is not weakened of one who says they clearly know the nature of the Mind

because they can say, It is a thinking thing, compared with a Blind man who says he clearly knows the nature of the Sun because he can say, It is a heating thing. 402
3. From the fact that one cannot say what else the Mind is, other than a thinking thing, it cannot be concluded that it is therefore nothing else besides. 403
4. The difficulty remains that to say the Mind is a non-extended thing is to say not what it is, but what it is not: as if it were said of Bucephalus The famous horse of Alexander the Great, used here as a standard example in logic. that he is not a fly. A Begging of the Question. original: "Peti Principium." A logical fallacy where the conclusion is assumed in the premises. One's own authority is assumed as a demonstration. The principal difficulties are ignored. 404

Doubt 5. Regarding the mixing of the Mind with the body, and regarding the feeling of pain: namely, that it does not seem possible if the Mind is unextended and incorporeal. ibid.
Response. 405
Counter-argument. ibid.
Article 1. The difficulties which seem to be objected against the conclusions actually attack the reasons themselves, or the principles, which lack the required firmness. ibid.
2. That the principle was assumed without proof, and the difficulties regarding the objects were avoided concerning the mixing of the Mind and the feeling of pain, if the mind is indeed unextended. 406
3. Even if the mental image is extended, it does not follow that it is as large as the object it represents. ibid.
4. By the same reason that a large image of a visible thing is impressed upon the small capacity of the eye, it seems to be impressed in the much smaller capacity of the brain or the mind. 407

Omission. original: "Praeteritio." A rhetorical term for passing over something or mentioning it briefly. Regarding certain remaining chapters from the last meditation. 408
Response. ibid.
Counter-argument. ibid.
Sole Article. That an opportunity for insulting was seized without cause and inappropriately, yet still on purpose. ibid.
Conclusion. 409
Response. ibid.
Counter-argument. ibid.
Sole Article. That the objections were without duplicity. The focus was not on the truth of things, but on the force of the arguments. A testimony of goodwill is gratefully received and returned. ibid.