SYMPOSIUM.

[The argument] is quickly suppressed by Phaedrus, who reminds the disputants of their tribute to the god. Agathon’s speech follows.

He will speak of the god first and then of his gifts. He is the fairest, most blessed, and best of the gods, and also the youngest, having had no existence in the old days of Iapetus and Cronos Titan figures from Greek mythology when the gods were at war. The things that were done then were done of necessity and not of love. For love is young and dwells in soft places—not like Ate Ate: the Greek goddess of ruin and folly in Homer, walking on the skulls of men, but in their hearts and souls, which are soft enough. He is all flexibility and grace; his habitation is among the flowers; and he cannot do or suffer wrong, for all men serve and obey him of their own free will. Where there is love, there is obedience, and where there is obedience, there is justice, for none can be wronged of his own free will. He is temperate as well as just, for he is the ruler of the desires, and if he rules them, he must be temperate. He is also courageous, for he is the conqueror of the lord of war. He is wise too, for he is a poet and the author of poetry in others. He created the animals; he is the inventor of the arts; all the gods are his subjects. He is the fairest and best in himself and the cause of what is fairest and best in others; he makes men to be of one mind at a banquet, filling them with affection and emptying them of disaffection; he is the pilot, helper, defender, and savior of men, in whose footsteps let every man follow, chanting a strain of love. Such is the discourse, half playful, half serious, which I dedicate to the god.

The turn of Socrates comes next. He begins by remarking satirically that he has not understood the terms of the original agreement, for he fancied that they meant to speak the true praises of love, but now he finds that they only say what is good of him, whether true or false. He begs to be absolved from speaking falsely, but he is willing to speak the truth and proposes to begin by questioning Agathon. The result of his questions may be summed up as follows:

Love is of something, and that which love desires is not that which love is or has; for no man desires that which he already is or has. Love is of the beautiful (compare the speech of Agathon, 196 A, B) and therefore does not possess the beautiful. The beautiful is the good, and therefore, in wanting and desiring the beautiful, love also wants and desires the good. Socrates professes to have asked the same questions and to have obtained the same answers from Diotima, a wise woman of Mantinea, who, like Agathon, had spoken first of love and then of his works.