The Works of Epictetus: Discourses, Enchiridion, and Fragments

viii

PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION.

side, perhaps I have erred in allowing myself a terminology that is not more diffuse than hers, but more flexible and varied. But after all, unless a new English version is to be made accessible to the public, there seems no use in making it at all.

Epictetus limits himself strictly to providing a code of practical ethics. While not ignoring metaphysics in their proper place, he directs his aims elsewhere. His essential principles are very simple. He holds that all things receive their character from our judgment concerning them; all objects and all events are merely semblances or phenomena to be interpreted according to the laws that Nature gives us. An obvious classification immediately occurs: all things are either controllable by our will, or they are uncontrollable. If controllable, we may properly exert our desire or aversion toward them, though always guardedly and moderately. If uncontrollable, they are nothing to us, and we are merely to accept them—not with resignation alone, but joyously—knowing that an all-wise Father rules the whole. According to Epictetus, all success comes from obedience to this rule; all failure proceeds from placing a false estimate on the phenomena of existence, from trying to control what is uncontrollable, or from neglecting what is within our power. "Two rules we should