The Works of Epictetus: Discourses, Enchiridion, and Fragments

PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION.

philosophy? To part with self-conceit" (I. 172). "That we ought not to be angry with the erring" forms the subject of a special chapter (I. 62). "All is full of beloved ones . . . by nature endeared to each other" (II. 91). "Who is there whom bright and agreeable children do not attract to play and creep and prattle with them?" (I. 216). The philosopher, "when beaten, must love those who beat him" (II. 72). As to suicide, there is a special argument against it (I. 35). In other places, he alludes to it ironically, with a sort of contempt; or he vindicates Providence by showing that we are not coerced even into living on earth if we do not desire it, but that even in this last resort, our will is free. He also implies, more than once, that suicide, which is the cowardice of a moment, is after all less blasphemous than the settled habit of faithless complaint. For this grumbling is what rouses his indignation more than anything else.

In his practical examples, he constantly recurs to the noblest traits of his famous predecessors—such as Socrates, Diogenes, and Zeno—and he also gives us glimpses of the finest characters whose names are otherwise unfamiliar, such as Rufus and Euphrates. Indeed, all his standards are practical; he denounces, satirizes, and thoroughly dissects all pretenders to philosophy, all mere logicians or rhapsodists, and brings everything to the test of practical righteousness.