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dependence on Platonist and Aristotelian thought, on the distinction between the celestial and sublunary realms, and the difference between being and becoming—for example in the following:
All the things that exist both come into being and exist conformably to the nature of the good. The things that exist exist, as they exist, while the things that come into being do not exist perpetually, nor do they exist in the same manner, but they revolve through generation to corruption, then from the latter to generation, and with respect to existence they are perdurative [athanata], but with respect to undergoing change they are somewhat different; for, whenever they retire into themselves, they exist by means of substance but come into being by means of corruption because nature preserves them with itself and brings them forth again into manifestation in accordance with the conditions of existence set down by the Creator. (De mag. 2.23, tr. Bandy)
Despite John's repeated references, however, to the Demiurge making order out of chaos (most often with a political angle, with Justinian or the emperor in general playing the role of creator or restorer of order), it seems an overreach to allege that John is consciously arguing for the eternal pre-existence of matter. As Schamp argues, John simply does not appear to be directly addressing the question of creation ex nihilo out of nothing.⁶¹ His material is more Neoplatonic topos a conventional theme or rhetorical device than specific borrowing from extant pagan interpreters.⁶² Furthermore, the distinction between non-Christian and non-Christian perspectives on this question is not watertight, as Maas admits: Synesius, Elias, and (possibly) Boethius are exceptions Maas mentions as self-identified Christians who nevertheless shared a "non-Christian" Neoplatonic perspective on the universe's beginninglessness.⁶³ On the other side, as Sorabji shows, pagans did not necessarily argue for pre-existence of matter.⁶⁴
John was at least nominally a Christian, but as for the truth of his heart, it seems that a modern reader's judgment on John's religion will depend to a large extent on presuppositions about the boundaries of Christianity and the potential deeper significance of John's manifest fascination with details of pagan religious practice and
chap. 13 (pp. 193–209); H. S. Lang and A. D. Macro (ed., tr.), Proclus: On the Eternity of the World (de Aeternitate Mundi) (Berkeley, 2001); and for a recent overview, M. W. Champion, Explaining the Cosmos: Creation and Cultural Interaction in Late-Antique Gaza (Oxford, 2014), pp. 71ff.
61. Schamp-Dubuisson, 1.1: liii, lv.
62. Schamp-Dubuisson, 1.1: liv.
63. Maas, p. 100, following Sorabji, p. 196; for further discussion of Boethius, see Sorabji, pp. 119–20.
64. Note especially Sorabji, p. 313–15.