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...[is proven], where it is clear from the determinations inherent in the notion of the subject that the predicate the property or characteristic being asserted about a subject can be inferred by legitimate reasoning. If anyone has once experienced the power of the scientific method scientific method original: methodi scientificæ; Wolff’s method of defining every term and proving every proposition from prior ones in compelling assent, he will never again complain about an excessive zeal for demonstrating.
But he who wishes to admit certain things without proof may, as far as I am concerned, "abound in his own sense" original: suo abundet sensu; a Biblical idiom meaning to be satisfied with one's own opinion or judgment and skip the demonstration that is set apart from the proposition; he may leave it to those who do not at all blame an excessive scrupulousness in demonstrating, but rather hold it in high esteem.
Since we commonly have only confused notions original: notiones confusas; general, un-analyzed understandings of words like "thing" or "cause" of ontological terms the basic vocabulary of being, such as essence, existence, and attribute, and yet distinct notions precise, analyzed definitions of abstract things are very often judged to be different from the confused ones, I thought it necessary to demonstrate the identity of our distinct notions with the confused (or at least incomplete) common ones. I do this so that it may be apparent that we are by no means changing the meaning of accepted terms.
We have derived our distinct notions from the things themselves; we have seen fit to draw wisdom from this source throughout all of Philosophy original: Philosophiam; for Wolff, this includes all rational knowledge, rather than from the thoughts of others. Common confused notions correspond to these same things, except that authors often express poorly what they think well. It is no wonder, then, that a consensus is found between the two, even if we were little concerned about seeking it. But he who [examines] the way in which we establish that consensus...