ON THE CATEGORIES.

it predicates in the "what it is." Furthermore, and easily understood, a species is that which is predicated in the "what it is" of several things differing in number. But this definition would apply to the most specific species, which is only a species, and to each genus; while the others would be those that are not the most specific. What is said would be clear in this way: under each category, there are certain most generic things, or again, other most specific things, or between the most generic and the most specific, others which are both genera and species, depending on what they are compared to. A most generic thing is that above which there can be no other higher genus, and a most specific thing is that below which there can be no other lower species. Between the most generic and the most specific are others which are both genera and species, though they are taken as one or the other depending on what they are compared to. Let this be clear in one category: Substance is itself a genus, and under it is Body; under Body is Animate Body; under that is Animal; under Animal is Rational Animal; under that is Man; and under Man is Socrates, or Plato, or this or that individual man. But in this chain, Substance is the most generic, as it is only a genus, and Man is the most specific, as it is only a species. Body is a species of Substance, but a genus of Animate Body. But Animate Body is a species of Body, and a genus of Animal. Again, Animal is a species of Animate Body, and a genus of Rational Animal. Rational Animal is a species of Animal, and a genus of Man. Man is a species of Rational Animal, but no longer a genus of the individuals—the men—but only a species; for everything that is predicated proximately before the individuals is a species, but no longer a genus. Just as Substance, being at the top because there is no genus before it, was the most generic, so Man, being a species after which there is no other species—not of those things that can be divided into species, but of the individuals (for it calls Socrates, or Plato, or Alcibiades, or this white thing, an individual)—would only be a species, the last species, or as we said, the most specific. Those in the middle would be species relative to those before them, and genera relative to those after them. Thus, these have two roles: one relative to those before them, in which respect they are called their species, and one relative to those after them, in which respect they are called their genera. The extremes have only one role: the most generic has a role relative to those under it, being the highest genus of all, but it no longer has a role relative to those before it, being the highest and first principle. As we said, above it there can be no other higher genus. The most specific also has one role, relative to those before it, of which it is a species; but it does not have a different role relative to those after it, but is called the species of the individuals. But it is called the species of the individuals as containing them, and again, a species of those before it as being contained by them. Therefore, they are defined thus: the most generic genus is that which, being a genus, is not a species, or again, above which there can be no other higher genus; the most specific species is that which, being a species, is not a genus, or which, being a species, we can no longer divide into species, or which is predicated in the "what it is" of several things differing in number. Those between the extremes they call intermediate species or genera, as each of them is set to be a species or a genus, depending on what it is taken against.

Those before the most specific species, up to the most generic, are called genera or intermediate species, as Agamemnon is an Atreid, a Pelopid, a Tantalid, and finally of Zeus. But in genealogies, they trace the beginning back to one (let us say, Zeus) in most cases; however, it is not so with genera and species. For since "Being" on existent/being is the common genus of all, not all things are of the same genus. Hence, there is a most generic genus, as Aristotle says. But they are distinct, as in the Categories, the first ten genera, like ten first principles. Even if one calls all things "beings," he will call them so equivocally, not univocally. If "Being" were the common genus of all, all beings would be called so univocally; but since there are ten first things, there is a commonality of name only, and no longer a commonality of the definition corresponding to the name. There are ten most generic things, while the most specific species are fixed in number, though not infinite; but the individuals, which are after the most specific species, are infinite. Therefore, Plato exhorted us to stop when descending from the most generic to the most specific, and to descend through the middle by dividing with specific differences. He says to leave the infinite aside; for there is no science of what is infinite. To descend to the most specific requires dividing through a multitude, and in going up to the most generic, one must collect the multitude into one; for the species gathers the many into one nature, and the genus does so even more. Conversely, the individual always divides the one into a multitude. The many men are one by participation in the species, but the one is divided into a multitude by the individuals. The individual must be divided, while the commonality must be gathered and synthesized. Having set forth what each of them is, the genus and the species, the genus is always predicated of the species—all those above of those below—but the species is never predicated of the genus immediately above it, nor of those further above; nor do they convert. One must predicate equal things of equal things, such as "whinnying" of a horse, or greater things of lesser things, such as "animal" of a man; but one cannot predicate lesser things of greater things. The animal is not the species of man, just as man is not the species of animal. Whatever the species is predicated of, the genus will necessarily be predicated of those same things, and the genus of the genus up to the most generic. If it is true to say "man" of Socrates, and "animal" of man, and "substance" of animal, it is also true to say "animal" or "substance" of Socrates. Because those above are always predicated of those below, the species will be predicated of the individual, the genus will be predicated of the species and the individual, and the most generic will be predicated of the genus, the species, and the individual. It is said that the most generic is of all the genera, species, and individuals under it; the genus before the most specific is of all the most specific species and individuals; the species alone is of all the individuals; and the individual is of one thing only, of the parts. It calls Socrates, or this white thing, or this person, the son of Sophroniscus, an individual, if only one son of Sophroniscus exists. It calls these individuals because they consist of properties, the collection of which would never be the same in any other individual. The properties of Socrates would not be the same in any other individual. However, the properties of man (I mean the common one) could be the same in several, or rather in all individual men, insofar as they are men.