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Aristotle · 1831

The nature of the good differs according to the nature of the being. For this reason, one must know the nature of philosophy. But since it is impossible to know this without a definition (for definitions are the dissections and unfoldings of natures), one must begin with the definition. The argument has arrived at this necessity. The definition answers the question "what is it."
Second Action. Because those who reject philosophy introduce it by attempting to prove that it does not exist (for a proof is a part of philosophy), we will set aside the question of "if it exists" and begin with "what it is," agreeing with those who have labored to reject it, since by their own practices they have made it clearer to us through their proofs. Or, as Aristotle says in the work inscribed Protrepticus, in which he urges the youth toward philosophy: "If one must philosophize, one must philosophize; if one must not philosophize, one must philosophize; therefore, in any case, one must philosophize." This means that even if philosophy does not exist, we are obligated to philosophize, as it is its own justification; if it does not exist, we are still obligated to inquire how philosophy does not exist, and by inquiring, we philosophize, since inquiry is the cause of philosophy.
Third Action. Second, let it be asked how "definition" (horismos) is named. It is named by a metaphor from "boundary setting" (horothesia). Long ago, when the Nile rose and confounded the fields, wars and murders occurred over the distribution of the land. They devised a kind of boundary setting to designate the places, and thus they ceased from warring; hence, the measure is called "boundary" by them from the cessation of murder (phonos). Thus, definitions are the explanations of natures, aiming at justice through reversal, knowing when they fall short or when they exceed.
A soloecismus solecism is named as a "corruption of pure speech."
Health is not produced by the doctor alone, but also happens by chance, as is said in the Treatise on Sects.
The orator Hyperides, when defending the prostitute Phryne, perceiving in his speeches that he did not persuade the judges, allowed the prostitute to tear her clothes, and from that sight of her breasts, he won the case.
Regarding this, the Pythia addressed Lycurgus (Herodotus 1.65):
"You have come here, Lycurgus, to my rich temple.
I am in doubt whether to pronounce you a god or a man."
One must know that there are neither more nor fewer definitions of philosophy.
Some add another seventh definition: for as doctors, having exchanged bronze for gold, do not swap gold back for bronze—
according to Homer, they defined the definitions, not as the medicine of bodies, but philosophy as the medicine of souls. But, O doctors, this is a circular demonstration.
They report an eighth definition said by Plato in the Theaetetus (*): he says there that philosophy is the "greatest music."
Fifth Action. Let us come to the explanation of these definitions. The first definition of philosophy is from the universal subject, which says: "The knowledge of beings insofar as they are beings." I cannot say in which writing Pythagoras said this; for he left no writings, but what writings are to others, his students were to him.
Natural death is not a voluntary life, when we live a life contrary to nature and pursue a dissolute life. I wished to hear these words of Cleombrotus; for he, saying (Anthology 7.471):
"Having said 'Farewell, Sun,' Cleombrotus of Ambracia
Leaped from a high wall into Hades,
Not having suffered any evil worthy of death, but having read
Plato’s scroll about the soul."
I say the opposite to him, since he is such:
"If Plato’s scroll had not shackled my impulse,
I would have already dissolved this wretched life, this heavy bond."
This means that if I had not been benefited by Plato’s way of living well, I would have preferred not to be rather than to be in an evil state. There is, therefore, a certain death that is better than a certain life, which philosophy professes one must practice.
Sixth Action. Not only Cleombrotus, but also the Stoic philosophers, being like certain Cleombrotuses, assumed that philosophy is the practice of natural death; hence they wrote of five ways of a rational departure. For, he says, life is like a long symposium, in which the soul seems to feast, and by as many ways as the symposium is dissolved, by so many ways do rational departures occur. The symposium is dissolved in five ways: either due to a great need that suddenly seizes one, such as the arrival of a friend after a long time (for friends rise and the symposium is dissolved due to joy); or the symposium is dissolved because of those who intrude and speak filthily; or because of the dead and diseased food placed before one; or due to a scarcity of food; or due to drunkenness. In the same five ways, rational departures occur: either due to a great need, as the Pythia ordered someone to sacrifice himself for the sake of his own city, when destruction hung over it—which Menoeceus did by sacrificing himself for his own fatherland and saving it; or because of tyrants who intrude and force us to do shameful things and speak of forbidden matters; thus, a Pythagorean woman, being confounded by a tyrant and forced to reveal the forbidden things—that is, the reason why they do not eat beans (for it was the same to them to eat beans as it was to eat the heads of their parents)—said...
(*) Actually in Phaedo p. 61.