Aristotelis Opera (Bekker Edition, Vol. 2): Metaphysica, Ethica, Politica, Rhetorica, Poetica

"Shall I eat, or shall I speak?" original: "φάγωμεν ἂν ἢ εἴποιμι." When he was forced to eat, he said again, "Shall I speak, or shall I eat?" Finally, being forced to do one of the two, either to eat or to speak, she bit off her own tongue and cut it away as an instrument of speech or taste, or as one tortured from that point, she departed this life. Or, if a long illness hinders the soul in its use of the body as an instrument for too long, it is reasonable to depart from it. For this reason, Plato does not accept the dietetic aspect of medicine, as it coddles diseases and causes them to linger, but he does accept the surgical and pharmaceutical, which Archytas used, treating the body as a fortress. Sophocles Aias 578 also says: "It is not for a wise physician to chant spells over a wound that needs the knife." Or [one may depart] due to poverty; or as Theognis 175 Bekk. says well:

One must flee poverty, Cyrnus, and cast oneself
Into the deep sea or from the high-reaching cliffs.

Or due to nonsense; just as a banquet is dissolved if there is drunkenness there, so too here it is reasonable for one to depart from life due to nonsense; for there is no nonsense unless it is a physical study, or there is no study unless it is a voluntary nonsense. So much for that. Plotinus, however, writes a single book on reasonable departure, which does not accept any of these five methods, etc. The laws of the Romans show this, as they do not surrender the bodies of those who take their own lives to burial until they have been punished at the feet.

Another definition of philosophy is taken from its ultimate end, which calls it "a becoming like unto God, as far as is possible for man." In the dialogue Theaetetus p. 176, Plato defined it in this way. Some raise the problem: how can the philosopher become like God? They say it is because he possesses the characteristics of the divine; for the poets characterize the divine in three ways: by goodness, by power, and by knowledge, as indicated by "the gods are givers of good things," "the gods are able to do all things," and "the gods know all things."

Seventh Action. Since Plato was not satisfied with calling philosophy "a becoming like unto God, as far as is possible for man," but also added a mode of this likeness, "and likeness is to become just and holy with wisdom, or to know these things," let us inquire into three points. First, why did he add holiness to justice? Second, why of the four cardinal virtues did he mention only two, justice and wisdom? Third, why did he say "or to know these things"?

Eighth Action. The fifth definition of philosophy, traced back to Aristotle, calls it "the art of arts and the science of sciences." This definition is stated by him in the work inscribed after the Physics, namely the Theology 1.2. And it is reasonably said because of its superiority, as it is in the theological treatise. Therefore, they also raise the problem of why he uses this doubling, and they give five reasons for this.

Aristotle says in an aphorism that all those who, by being idle in other

arts and sciences, neglect philosophy, are like the suitors of Penelope, who, unable to wed her, tried to wed her handmaidens.

The art of building, wishing to know if a wall is straight, uses a plummet.

Someone wounded in war by a friend said, "I have saved myself. What is that shield to me? Let it go," calling his own soul "himself" and calling his own body a "shield." Another, when passing by, said, "I am going to water my donkey," calling the body a "donkey." And [another] said, "Grind, grind the pouch of Anaxarchus; you will never grind Anaxarchus himself."

Ninth Action. The sixth definition of philosophy, traced back to Pythagoras, calls it "the love of wisdom."

Tenth Action. The division of philosophy... what is division, and subdivisions or partitions.

He divides (the theoretical) into three: into physics, mathematics, and theology. And rightly so.

Some raise the problem: if we learn everything, the immaterial, the material, and the intermediate, why are only the intermediate called "mathematics" original: "mathemata", and why did they appropriate the common name? They give two reasons for this. First, because mathematics have the clarity of demonstrations; for we learn these precisely, while we conjecture about the others more than we learn them. This is why the philosopher Marinus said, "If only all things were mathematics." Second, because we learn these with pleasure, suffering the fate of the Lotus-eaters; for once having tasted them, we do not wish to depart from them, but we hold fast to them like a drug. Or Plato says it this way: what the soul has once grasped, it loves to become indelible and unchangeable, just as, he says, nothing violent is a lasting study for the soul. And Archimedes, when the barbarians stood over Syracuse, did not flee while drawing a geometric theorem, but said, "Guard my head and not the line," that is, spare the head and not the diagram. And the present action contains these things.

Eleventh Action. The theoretical having been divided into three—physics, mathematics, and theology—the commentators now present only the division of mathematics, as this has a symmetry toward those who are beginners. Let us state the subdivision of mathematics. It is divided into four: into arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. And rightly so.

They raise the problem: if music is concerned with the symmetry and asymmetry of sounds, how can they say it is concerned with the relations of numbers? They say that perhaps these things are said of the music of Pythagoras as being more immaterial, which does not involve matter or sounds, but contemplates the very relations of numbers alone. For they say that he, passing by a smithy, heard the harmony resulting from the striking of the hammers, which allowed him to change the anvils. And the melody from where the same was kept allowed him to change the hammers again.