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Aristotle · 1831

In the definition of the genus we mentioned the species, and in the definition of the species we mentioned the genus. But those who say this are ignorant of the fact that circular reasoning is rather to be accepted in the case of relative terms, not rejected; circular reasoning is, for example: where does Plato reside? This marks the end of the text fragment.
Those who love the discourses of philosophy and have tasted them even with the tip of their fingers, having bid farewell to all the cares of life, are driven toward these with a certain sober madness, and are carried away to satisfy their desire with the knowledge of beings; for philosophy is the knowledge of beings, as we shall learn with God's help. Since, therefore, a wise love for this has manifested much eagerness for this contest in us, come then, let us now undertake it, not calculating the difficulty that is present, but looking toward the end of the divine promise itself, and let us consider every toil to be lesser and secondary to it. It seems to me appropriate to postpone the encyclical explanation for a short while, obeying the Aristotelian decrees, as it is necessary in almost every subject to seek these four chapters: if it is, what it is, what sort of thing it is, and why it is.
The second act, with God's help. Just as we promised in the previous theory, let us come and set forth the arguments of those who wish to abolish the existence of philosophy, so that we may produce their refutation from these. The first argument of those who refute philosophy is this: if the being of homonyms is, and homonyms fall under definitions, but things that do not fall under definitions do not fall under knowledge, then being is unknown... We respond in two ways, using both objection and counter-argument. Know that it is the work of an objection to refute the opposite arguments from the very starting gate, as it were, and immediately from the outset, while the counter-argument is to accept the argument as true, but to show that it in no way harms the proposed subject...
The second argument of those who refute philosophy proceeds in this way. Beings are in a state of flux and outflow and do not attain any stability; the arguments are outrun by the changing things; for things almost change before the discourse about them can be spoken. They bring this example: just as in a river one cannot dip one's foot into the same water twice, and as others extending the difficulty say that one cannot even dip one's foot once into the same water, because that water is quickly passing by and other water is coming after, so too things being in flux and outflow do not attain stability, and clearly do not fall under knowledge...
The third argument of those who refute philosophy is this. Things that are known fall under perception, as Plato Timaeus, p. 47 shows, saying: "For the creator gifted us with sight and hearing, so that through these we might set right the kind of philosophy."
Taking this as agreed upon, they say that if we show from your division that the parts of philosophy cannot exist, it is clear that philosophy does not consist. They say, therefore, that according to you, philosophy is divided into theoretical and practical, and the theoretical into mathematical, physiological, and theological; if, therefore, we refute these, it is clear that philosophy does not consist. They say that the mathematical is not a part of philosophy, as Plato holds; for he does not consider the mathematical to be a part of philosophy, but a sort of preliminary exercise, like grammar or rhetoric; whence he inscribed upon his school: "Let no one enter who is not a geometer." The physiological is refuted, they say, by the second argument which says that beings are in flux and outflow. And they refute the theological thus: they say that divine things do not fall under perception, and things that do not fall under perception do not fall under knowledge; therefore, divine things are unknown. These are matters regarding these points, but it must be said that they have said nothing regarding the practical, which is divided against the theoretical; so it is clear that they have not abolished all of philosophy; for even the practical is a part of philosophy...
The fourth argument of those who refute philosophy has this form. Philosophy is knowledge or it is not knowledge; if it is not knowledge, it is clear that it is neither a science nor an art; for every art and science is knowledge; for it knows the things that are subject to it. If it is knowledge, it is partial. If it is partial, it is inferior to other arts; for those are universal knowledges, having universal rules; for grammar, rhetoric, and medicine have universal rules. If it is inferior to other arts, how do you call it the art of arts and the science of sciences? If it is universal knowledge, it cannot consist; this is clear from here. If it is universal knowledge, it is a universal accident; and knowledge is some accident (for it is a quality, and quality, as we shall learn, is an accident); but universal accidents cannot be contemplated in a partial subject; for universal whiteness cannot be contemplated in the swan alone, since it would not need to be contemplated in any other, such as in snow or white lead or milk. If, therefore, philosophy is universal knowledge, it is clear that it cannot be contemplated in a partial subject, such as in Socrates, in Plato, or in Alcibiades. If it is not contemplated in a subject, it is clear that it does not exist; for accidents that are not contemplated in a subject do not exist. These are their points, but it is possible to refute them thus, etc.
Act four. These people (those who attempted to abolish the existence of philosophy)...