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Aristotle · 1831

Let us undertake these struggles, having arrived at the explanation of the text itself. This proposed text, I mean the preface, has a twofold delivery. In the first preface, it delivers three things: the goal, the usefulness, and the method of instruction. In the second preface, it delivers certain causes for the things that are to be said.
They used to call Iris, the messenger of the gods, the daughter of Thaumas, allegorically understanding philosophy. For they say that Iris is philosophy. Just as Iris is fabled by the poets to be the messenger of the gods, so too is philosophy the messenger of God. For it announces to us divine things, if indeed it is the knowledge of divine and human affairs. They called her the daughter of Thaumas, since the beginning of philosophy is wonder original: "θαῦμα".
Moreover, it is necessary, as Pindar says, to place a bright face before every house; for the propylaea gateways of houses must be brilliant.
It is worth inquiring why Porphyry made the order of the five voices in this way, that is, why he placed genus first, difference second, species third, property fourth, and accident fifth. But before this, let us say a few things from the outside.
Some find fault with the beginning, saying that it is ill-conceived. They say, if it is homonymous, and the homonymous is indefinite, then it is also indefinite; and the beginning must not be made from indefinite things. To this we say that "being" is not homonymous, as was already shown in the previous referring to the Categories works, but it is "from one thing." What those things are that are "from one thing," we shall know perfectly in the Categories. Furthermore, they ask why he prioritized the necessary over the existing. We state three reasons for this.
Again, some ask why he said "necessary" and not "just," "good," or "useful."
They also ask why, having said "of the categories," he says "of those from Aristotle." For it would have sufficed to say "of the categories." Some say that he said "of Aristotle" in contrast to others; for he wishes to show that it contributes to the categories of Aristotle and not of others. For Theophrastus and Eudamus also wrote about categories in imitation of their own teacher. But these people solved it poorly; for if it once contributes to the Categories of Aristotle, it contributes to all categories. This ought to have been said: that he wishes to show from the greater that it contributes to all categories, if indeed it does to those of Aristotle Ammonius, fol. 23b, notes that some say he spoke of Aristotle's Categories because the knowledge of these five voices is useful for those of Archytas as well.. They also ask why he placed the greater part of the "useful" before the "goal."
Let us learn what division, definition, demonstration, and analysis are.
Some raise objections, saying why he placed definition before division, even though it was shown that division wishes to precede definition.
Again, some object why he did not mention the analytic.
Some object, saying why he says "being useful," even though it was shown that "useful" admits of being set aside. For this reason, he also ordered it as "necessary."
Since we have mentioned obscurity, come, let us teach whence obscurity is born. Obscurity arises either from the language or from the theorems. From the theorems, as is the case with the works of Heraclitus; for these exist as deep and terrible. For it is said of the writings of Heraclitus that they require a deep diver. Obscurity arises from language in two ways: either from the length of the phrasing, as is the case with the works of Galen (for even if they are eloquent, they are still obscure because of their length), or from the quality of the language, as is the case with the works of Aristogenes. For he says "sweet-laboring and stuffed," but what kind of labor is sweet and stuffed we do not know. Why do we attempt to demonstrate this from others, when we are well-supplied to show this from the very leaders and guides of philosophy, I mean Plato and Aristotle? For one of them habitually created obscurity through his phrasing, and the other through his theorems. For the Aristotelian theorems are easy, but the phrasing is difficult. If you understand what entelechy actualization, quantity, power, and idea are, the things said appear easy to you; therefore, it is the phrasing that is difficult. But the Platonic theorems are quite difficult and troublesome, and, simply put, hold almost every opinion (that this is true is clear from the ability to adapt them in every explanation to whatever you wish), but the phrasing is easy, smooth, and, simply put, Platonic.
Homer taught his own philosophy through myths. But one who pays attention only to the phrasing cannot grasp the depths of the meaning; for the things said are one thing, and the things interpreted through allegory are another. About this, Apollonius of Tyana said that by saying everything, he said nothing. For this reason, Plato, knowing the depth of the various theorems, exhorted the young not to read Homer, lest by paying attention to the phrasing, they might think that to be the meaning, and thus persist in having that opinion; for the hearing of the young loves to preserve the voice of its own teachers.
But Pythagoras also touched upon this. For he, wishing to know the genuine and the base among those having a relationship toward their teacher, always asked the students what dreams they might see, knowing that nocturnal fantasies arise from the thoughts and movements of the day; for whatever the soul has chosen, this it imagines even when the body is at rest. He said, therefore, that if someone has a genuine relationship toward their readings, the nocturnal fantasy reveals it, being a messenger of the daily deliberations. Plato, knowing this, wished to make the trial not only through the obscurity of the theorems but also through symposia, knowing that then the one being questioned reveals the truth when wine relaxes the heart and makes one slow to be moved toward falsehood.
Some say, because he was altogether in doubt about this, whether it is genus or difference, that he says "I could have made it various," seeking...