Aristotle's Psychology: On the Soul and Parva Naturalia

beyond compare and divine, but are less accessible to
knowledge. The evidence that might throw light on them
and on the problems which we long to solve respecting
them, is furnished but scantily by sensation, whereas
respecting perishable plants and animals we have abun-
dant information, living as we do in the midst of them,
and ample data may be collected concerning all their
different varieties if only we are willing to take sufficient
pains. Both departments, however, have their special
charm. The scanty conceptions to which we can attain
of celestial things give us, from their excellence, more
pleasure than all our knowledge of the world in which
we live; just as a half glimpse of persons whom we love
is more delightful than a leisurely view of other things,
whatever their number and dimensions. On the other
hand, in certitude and in completeness our knowledge of
terrestrial things has the advantage. Moreover, their
greater nearness and affinity to us balance somewhat the
loftier interest of the heavenly things that are the objects
of the higher philosophy. Having already treated of the
celestial world, as far as our conjectures could reach, we
proceed to treat of animals, without omitting, to the best
of our ability, any member of the kingdom, however
ignoble. For if some have no graces to charm the sense,
yet even these, by disclosing to intellectual perception the
artistic spirit that designed them, give immense pleasure
to all who can trace links of causation and are in-
clined to philosophy.”¹

¹ Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, translated by Ogle, London, 1882, p. 16.