The Complete Works of Plato

to the one who is conscious of no injustice within himself, a sweet hope is always present and a good nurse of old age, as Pindar also says. For he spoke of this quite gracefully, Socrates, when he said: that whoever leads a life that is just and
» holy, a sweet hope, nursing his heart, attends him, the nurse of his old age, which most of all governs the much-turning mind of mortals. He speaks well, then. Wonderfully so, and with great force. Regarding this, I put forward the possession of wealth as being of the greatest value, not for every man, but for the decent one. For the fact that one need not depart for that place having deceived or lied to anyone, even against one's will, nor again being in debt either for some sacrifices to a god or for money to a man, the possession of wealth contributes a great part toward this. It has also many other uses. But, setting one against another, I would consider it no small thing for a man of sense, Socrates, that wealth is most useful. Most beautifully spoken, I said, Cephalus. But regarding this very thing, justice, shall we say that it is simply truthfulness and returning what one has received from someone, or is it the case that these same acts are sometimes done justly and sometimes unjustly? I mean something like this: Everyone would surely agree that if one were to receive weapons from a friend who is of sound mind, and then he should go mad and demand them back, it would not be right to return such things, nor would the one who returns them be just. Nor again, would one wish to tell the truth to a man in such a state. You say well, he said. Therefore, this is not the definition of justice: to speak the truth and to return what one has received. Indeed it is not, said Socrates, interrupting—Polemarchus speaking. At least if one must believe Simonides. And certainly, said Cephalus, I entrust the argument to you. For I must now attend to the sacrifices. Am I, then, said I, the heir of your arguments, Polemarchus? By all means, he said, laughing. And at the same time, he went off toward the sacrifices. Tell me, then, you heir of the argument, what do you say Simonides means when he says that he speaks correctly concerning justice? That it is, he said, to return to each person what is owed; in saying this, he seems to me to speak well. But, I said, it is not easy to distrust Simonides. For the man is wise and divine. Yet, as to what he means, perhaps you, Polemarchus, know, but I do not. For it is clear that he does not mean what we were just saying—that one should return to someone who has deposited something, if they ask for it when they are not of sound mind. And yet, what was deposited is surely owed. Is it not? Yes. But it should not be returned at all, in any way, when one asks for it when not of sound mind. True, he said. Some other thing, then, it seems, Simonides means by saying that it is just to return what is owed. It is indeed something else, by Zeus, he said. For he thinks that friends owe it to their friends to do them some good, and no evil. I understand, I said. That he does not return what is owed when one returns gold to a depositor if the return and the receipt become harmful, and both the one receiving and the one returning are friends. Do you not say that Simonides says this? By all means. But what of enemies—must we return to them whatever it happens that is owed? Most certainly, he said, that which is owed to them. And what is owed, I suppose, by an enemy to an enemy is that which is appropriate: some evil. Simonides, then, I said, was speaking in riddles, as it seems, in the poetic manner, as to what justice might be. For he intended, as it appears, that justice is to return to each what is appropriate, and this he named "what is owed." But how? he said. By Zeus, I said, if someone were to ask him, “Simonides, what craft, in rendering what is owed and appropriate, is called medicine?” What do you think he would answer us? Clearly, he said, that which renders to bodies drugs and food and drink. And what craft, in rendering what is owed and appropriate, is called the culinary art? The one that gives seasonings to dishes. Very well. What, then, is the craft that renders to whom what is owed, that would be called justice? If one must follow, Socrates, what was said before, it is the one that renders to friends and enemies benefits and harms. Do you mean that justice is to benefit friends and harm enemies? That seems so to me. Who, then, is most capable of treating friends who are sick, and harming enemies, in relation to disease and health? A physician. And who, in relation to the danger of the sea, for those who are sailing?