The Complete Works of Plato

navigator. What then of the just man? In what action and toward what work is he most powerful in benefiting friends and harming enemies? In making war and acting as an ally, it seems to me. Be it so. But for those who are not laboring, my dear Polemarchus, the physician is useless. True. And for those not sailing, the navigator? Yes. Is the just man also useless to those who are not at war? It does not seem so to me. Is justice, then, also useful in peace? It is useful. And agriculture, is it or not? Yes. For the acquisition of produce, at least? Yes. And what of shoemaking? Yes. For the acquisition of footwear, I suppose you would say? Certainly.

What then of justice? For the service or acquisition of what would you say it is useful in peace? For contracts, Socrates. And by contracts do you mean partnerships, or something else? Partnerships, indeed. Is the just man, then, a good and useful partner in the placing of counters, or is the expert in counters? The expert in counters. But in the placing of bricks and stones, is the just man a more useful and better partner than the builder? Not at all. In what partnership, then, is the just man a better partner than the musician, just as the musician is better than the just man in the matter of strings? In the matter of money, it seems to me. Except perhaps, Polemarchus, in the use of money, when it is necessary to deposit or dispense money in common. Is it, then, when it is to be put to use? Yes. And when it is to be kept, as it were? Yes.

And when there is a ship, is the shipwright or the navigator [the more useful]? It seems so. Thus, when it is necessary to use silver or gold in common, is the just man more useful than others? When it is to be deposited and kept safe, Socrates. So you mean when there is no need to use it, but it is to lie idle? Certainly. When, therefore, silver is useless, justice is useful for it? It seems so. And when a sickle needs to be guarded, is justice useful, both in common and privately? And when it is to be used, is viticulture [the useful skill]? It appears so. And regarding a shield and a lyre, when they must be guarded and not used, is justice useful, but when they are to be used, [is the skill of] the hoplite and the musician [useful]? Of necessity. And regarding all other things, justice is useless for each when in use, and useful when in disuse? It seems so.

So, my friend, justice would be something quite unimportant if it happens to be useful only for useless things. But let us consider this: is not the one most clever at striking in a fight, whether boxing or otherwise, the same one most clever at guarding? Certainly. Is he who is clever at guarding against and escaping a disease also the most clever at producing one? It seems so to me. And in the case of an army, is not the same person a good guard who is also clever at stealing the enemy's plans and other actions? Certainly. Of whatever, then, one is a clever guard, of that he is also a clever thief. It seems so. If, therefore, the just man is clever at guarding money, he is also clever at stealing it, as at least the argument indicates. The just man has thus appeared to be a kind of thief, as it seems; and you are likely to have learned this from Homer, for he even praises Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, and says that he surpassed all men in thievery and perjury. It seems, then, that justice, according to you, and Homer, and Simonides, is a kind of thievery, though intended for the benefit of friends and the harm of enemies—was that not what you said? No, by Zeus, he said. But I no longer know what I was saying; yet this still seems to me to be the case: that justice benefits friends and harms enemies.

But by friends, do you mean those whom each person believes to be decent, or those who truly are, even if they do not seem so? And likewise with enemies? It is likely, he said, that one loves those he deems decent, and hates those he deems wicked. Do not men, then, err in this, so that it seems to them that many are decent who are not, and many are the opposite? They do err. To these, then, the good are enemies and the wicked are friends. Certainly. But yet it is just at that time to benefit the wicked and harm the good? It seems so. And yet the good are just and such as not to commit injustice. True. According to your argument, then, it is just to treat those who commit no injustice badly? By no means, Socrates, he said. For the argument seems to be wicked. It is just, then, to harm the unjust and to benefit the just.