The Complete Works of Plato

“Very soon now, once I have answered. For I think you have an opinion, but listen and see: I say that justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger. But why do you not praise it? Oh, you will not be willing.” “If I learn first what you mean, I will; for now I do not yet know. You say that the advantage of the stronger is justice. And what, Thrasymachus, do you mean by this? For surely you do not mean something like this: if Polydamas, our pancratiast, is stronger than we are, and beef is advantageous to him for his body, that this food is also advantageous—and at the same time just—for us who are weaker than he is.” “You are disgusting, Socrates,” he said; “and you take the argument in the direction where you can do it the most harm.” “Not at all, my excellent friend,” I said. “But speak more clearly what you mean.” “Then do you not know,” he said, “that of cities, some are governed by tyrants, some by democracies, and some by aristocracies?” “How could I not?” “And does not the governing power in each city hold the control?” “Certainly.” “And each government sets laws for its own advantage: a democracy makes democratic laws, a tyranny makes tyrannical laws, and others do the same; and in doing so, they declare that what is to their own advantage is just for the governed, and they punish anyone who departs from this as one who acts unlawfully and unjustly. This, then, my good man, is what I mean: in all cities, the same thing is just—the advantage of the established government. And this, surely, holds the power. So that for anyone who reasons correctly, it follows that justice is the same everywhere: the advantage of the stronger.” “Now I understand what you mean,” I said; “whether it is true or not, I shall try to learn. But you, Thrasymachus, have also answered that the advantageous is just—though you forbade me from giving that very answer. And yet, there is added to it: ‘of the stronger.’” “A small addition, perhaps,” he said. “It is not yet clear whether it is great. But it is clear that we must examine whether you are speaking the truth. For since I admit that justice is some sort of advantage—and you add and claim that it is that of the stronger, while I am ignorant of it—we must examine it.” “Examine it,” he said. “That shall be done,” I said; “and tell me: do you not also say that it is just to obey the rulers?” “I do.” “Are the rulers in each of the cities infallible, or are they capable of erring?” “They are certainly capable of erring,” he said. “So, when they set out to establish laws, do they establish some correctly and some incorrectly?” “I think so.” “And does ‘correctly’ mean establishing what is advantageous to themselves, and ‘incorrectly’ what is disadvantageous? Or how do you mean it?” “That is how.” “But when they have established them, must the governed do them, and is that justice?” “How could it be otherwise?” “Then, according to your argument, it is just not only to do what is to the advantage of the stronger, but also the opposite, what is disadvantageous.” “What are you saying?” he asked. “What you are saying, I believe; but let us examine it better: has it not been agreed that the rulers, in commanding the governed to do certain things, sometimes miss what is best for themselves, and yet that it is just for the governed to do whatever the rulers command? Has this not been agreed?” “I think so,” he said. “Then,” I said, “you must also agree that it is just to do what is disadvantageous to the rulers and the stronger, whenever the rulers command things contrary to their own interest. Since you say it is just to do what they command, my clever Thrasymachus, does it not necessarily follow that it is just to do the opposite of what you say? For the disadvantageous of the stronger is being commanded to be done by the weaker.” “Yes, by Zeus,” said Polemarchus, “that is most clear, Socrates.” “If you were to bear witness for him,” said Cleitophon, breaking in. “And what need is there of a witness?” he said; “for Thrasymachus himself admits that the rulers sometimes command things that are bad for themselves, and that it is just for the governed to do those things. For Thrasymachus established that it is just to do what is ordered by the rulers, Polemarchus; or did he also establish that the advantage of the stronger is just? Having established both of these, he further admitted that the stronger sometimes order the weaker and the governed to do things that are disadvantageous to themselves. And from this admission, it would follow that the advantage of the stronger is no more just than the disadvantageous.” “But,” said Cleitophon, “the advantage of the stronger—